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INTRODUCTION
On the occasion of the centennial of The Yale Law Journal, this essay
presents a compilation of the Journal's most-cited articles. Such a project, in
an age already deluged with lists and rankings, bears a burden of justification.
(Sheer curiosity may suffice as a rationale. For those of you who cannot wait
to see the compilation, Table I is on page 1462.)
Legal education has been buffeted by its full share of the ranking deluge.
For example, U.S. News & World Report has published high-profile law school
rankings, in the latest of which Harvard Law School placed a surprising fifth
because of low scores in three areas not usually thought of as weaknesses of
that school-namely, placement success, salaries of graduates, and graduation
rate.' In the early 1980's, the deplorable Gourman Report attracted much
attention and, regrettably, influenced the choices of many law school applicants
with an ambitious rating of law schools. Among other remarkable features, the
Report compared schools on a global scale (Paris beat out Harvard, Michigan,
Yale, and Oxford for first, with Moscow State fifteenth) and exhibited a 100%
correlation among five seemingly distinct components: quality of administration,
quality of curriculum, faculty instruction, faculty research, and library
resources.
2
Another chapter in the legal Book of Lists could be devoted to ratings of
publishing productivity of law school faculty. This literature includes a study
of faculty productivity in leading law reviews, compiled by a law professor at
t Assistant Librarian for Public Services and Lecturer in Legal Research, Yale Law School. I am
grateful to Scott Brewer, Lory A. Barsdate, and Peter E. Bass of The Yale Law Journal, Volume 97, for
their receptiveness when I first proposed this project, and to Morris L. Cohen, Roy M. Mersky, Joyce
Saltalamachia, Carl A. Yirka, and Margaret M.R. Durkin for their general encouragement and support.
Eugene Garfield, James A. Mears, and Anne Leinbach of the Institute for Scientific Information provided
invaluable data described in the text.
1. Best Professional Schools: Law, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 19, 1990, at 59.
2. J. GouPmiN, THE GoumiAN REPORT 69-77 (2d ed. 1983). For example, according to Professor
Gourman, Syracuse University College of Law had the 63d best administration, the 63d best curriculum,
the 63d best faculty instruction, the 63d best faculty research, and the 63d best library resources. Id. at 73.
I have not found a single instance in any of Gourman's tables of one school being superior to a second in
one respect but inferior in another.
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Arizona State, in which Arizona State ranked seventh in the country in "pages
per faculty member."'3 An unpublished but well-publicized memorandum from
a Northwestern University law professor to the school's faculty and deans,
explicitly triggered by the school's disappointing U.S. News rating, showed
Northwestern as third in "items per faculty member, top ten law reviews" and
"out of house pages per faculty, all law reviews."4 Productivity charts have
now been institutionalized by the Chicago-Kent Law Review's promised-to-be-
annual "Faculty Scholarship Survey." The first year's lists have IT Chicago-
Kent College of Law as a highly respectable number twenty in both "pages
published per faculty member in the twenty leading journals (excluding in-
house articles)" and "pages published per faculty member in the ten leading
journals (excluding in-house articles)."5
Legal statistics freaks have also turned their attention to ranking the most
frequently cited law reviews. The UCLA Law Review published The Citing of
Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study. The UCLA Law
Review itself only tied for twenty-fifth, but scored an impressive second in the
"most improved" category.6 An interesting twist on the home-team phenome-
non was provided by a scholar who expressed "surprise" in an interview that
his article, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, which rated
Hofstra Law Review ninth in "combined rankings of journal and judicial
citations per 1,000 pages," 7 was the subject of a front-page story in Hofstra
Law School's student newspaper, but was rejected by the Hofstra Law Review.8
The justification for a ranking of the most-cited Yale Law Journal articles
(beyond curiosity) is easily summarized. Citation-counting, as I have stated in
my previous article on the subject, "falls somewhere between historiography
and parlor game,"9 but has been shown to correlate highly with peer judgments
of scholarly influence. Lists of most-cited works therefore serve to draw
attention to authors and publications that, by a rough measure, have had the
most extensive impact on scholarship. In Part I of this essay, I further sketch
out my own viewpoint, grounded in the findings of information science and the
3. Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
681, 688 (1983).
4. Memorandum from Mayer Freed to Faculty and Deans of Northwestern University School of Law
(Feb. 1, 1989).
5. Note, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 65 CH.[-]KENT L. REV. 195, 212,
216 (1989).
6. Sirico & Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34
UCLA L. REV. 131, 142, 147 (1986).
7. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JUMETRICS L 400, 412 (1986).
8. Coleman, Reviewing Reviews, STUDENT LAW., Mar. 1986, at 5. In poking fun at the tendency of
authors and law reviews to choose methodologies of comparing faculty productivity or journal-citation
frequency favoring their own institutions, I do not mean to impugn the validity of the above-mentioned
studies, nor to liken them to the questionable methods of Gourman and US. News. I myself, in submitting
for publication an article tabulating most-cited law review articles, Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1540 (1985), sent it only to reviews that showed up creditably in the listing.
9. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 1540.
1450 [Vol. 100: 1449
Most-Cited Articles
sociology of knowledge, on the significance of a publication's being highly
cited.'0 In addition, I propose avenues of future research in legal citation
analysis.
Citation counts can also be a means of focusing on a particular subset
within a scholarly literature and spotlighting writings within that subset whose
impact has been exceptional. The Yale Law Journal has been a central compo-
nent of legal literature, and its centennial is an appropriate occasion for identify-
ing the "citation superstars" it has published in the course of its century of
existence. In Table I, 1 I list the thirty most-cited articles from the Journal,
ordered by the number of citations received within other articles. Part II of this
essay explains the sources, limitations, and other characteristics of my data.
For Part II, in order to record other, more personal viewpoints on the
significance of supercitedness "straight from the horse's mouth," I invited some
of the authors of the most-cited Yale Law Journal articles to comment briefly
on their citation landmark papers. Because of space restrictions, I was forced
to limit this invitation to authors of the sixteen most-cited articles from Table
I, two older articles from further down the list, and the two older articles
appended at the end of Table I. Where the author was deceased or was unable
to contribute a commentary, I asked a distinguished scholar with an interest in
the article's subject matter to comment.
In my invitation to the article authors, I suggested that the commentaries
address the questions: "What impact do you feel the article has had on other
scholars, on the courts, or on legislation? Have your views on the topic
changed? Would you write the article differently today?" For the commentators
who were not the authors, I posed only the first question. My intention, howev-
er, was to give the authors and commentators wide discretion to address
whatever issues they preferred, and the commentaries, in fact, take a variety
of approaches.
In some cases, the authors' retrospection required revisiting arenas from
which their interests have shifted. Some of the authors express or imply disap-
proval of the enterprise of citation-counting. The Yale Law Journal and I are
grateful to the article authors for joining, nonetheless, in this commemoration.
We would particularly like to thank William R. Perdue, Jr., coauthor with Lon
L. Fuller of the milestone 1936 article, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages,2 and Myres S. McDougal, coauthor with Harold D. Lasswell of
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest
(1943),"3 for each sharing the perspective of a half-century's experience. We
10. More extensive discussion may be found in my prior article and sources referred to therein. Id.
at 1540-44.
11. See infra table accompanying note 58.
12. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Parts 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J 52, 373
(1936-37).
13. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest, 52 YALE L. 203 (1943).
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are equally grateful to the commentators who were not the authors for their
participation.
I have suggested that the commentaries may be read as explorations of the
question "What does it mean to be frequently cited?" This theme is explicit in
a few of the pieces. George L. Priest, for example, writes that William L.
Prosser's Assault Upon the Citadel14 has been heavily cited "not because its
ideas were influential, nor, surely, because it initiated a school of thought," but
because it "was perfectly positioned to catch the wave of enthusiasm for greater
manufacturer liability."'"
John Hart Ely distinguishes being cited from being read, asserting that
citations to one of his articles pop up in string citations supporting a particular
proposition and that "no evidence exists that anyone has read it.' 6 Joseph
Goldstein casts the most skeptical eye on citationology, fearing that such
ranking "could become an invidious virus in the world of scholarship. It bears
no relationship to scholarly merit."' 7 Goldstein also echoes Ely's distinction
between citing an article and reading or understanding it.'8
The other commentators do not controvert the rationale of citation analysis
(maybe they are just being polite). I see in most of the commentaries a tacit
acceptance of the notion that scholarly influence, though complex and not
always reflected in explicit published references, is often articulated through
citation links. The commentators who choose to address the question of article
impact are describing the flesh and blood of a process of influence-what Carol
M. Rose calls a "scholarly conversation"---which can also, in a skeletal
form, be profitably studied using citation analysis.
I find that a number of the articles on my list share a notable distinction.
Part of their impact in breaking new ground is an impact on vocabulary. We
speak a different language in their wake. We talk of "entitlement programs"
because Charles A. Reich introduced a new sense of the word "entitlement"
in his article, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues.0 The terms "decision-making" and "content analysis" occur in Lass-
well and McDougal's Legal Education and Public Policy prior to the earliest
examples recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary,2' and much of the
modem connotation of the word "policy" stems from that article and other
writings by these two authors. Wesley N. Hohfeld, in Some Fundamental
14. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.L 1099 (1960).
15. Infra commentary following note 70.
16. Infra commentary preceding note 82.
17. Infra commentary following note 115.
18. Infra commentary following note 115.
19. Infra commentary following note 107.
20. Entitlement in the sense of "right to governmental benefits" appears in Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L. 1245, 1255-56 (1965). Reich had earlier used
the corresponding sense of the verb entitled in The New Property, 73 YALE L. 733, 786 n.233 (1964).
21. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 13, at 220, 287. The OED's earliest citations for both terms
are dated 1953.
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Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, contributed a jurisprudential
analysis whose impact was in large part terminological. Fuller and Perdue 3
shaped contract law by naming three interests served by contract damage
awards. 4 Other articles on the list, such as those by Guido Calabresi, Thomas
I. Emerson, and Joseph L. Sax, were not specifically neologistic but influenced
the content and range of legal discourse in a broader sense.
Impact on terminology and discourse is a form of influence which may not
always be reflected in counts of explicit citations, and thus resembles the
phenomenon of "obliteration" identified by Robert K. Merton and other sociolo-
gists of science.35 The work of some thinkers is so influential that it is inte-
grated into the common body of knowledge to the point where scholars no
longer feel they have to cite it explicitly. "Anybody who cited Einstein's
original paper when he writes E=mc2 would be laughed at." The most inter-
esting legacy of the articles on my list may well be found in subsequent work
which does not cite them.
I. LEGAL CITATION ANALYSIS
A. Rationale
Legal communication has two principal components: words and citations.
Citations are strings of names and numbers which refer, for a variety of pur-
poses, to prior writings. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic recently have
echoed my suggestion that the history and structure of legal thought can be
illuminated through study of the history of legal words.27 Analysis of the
citations employed by legal writers offers similar promise as a tool for explora-
tion of legal thought.
Citation analysis is now extensively used by information scientists and
sociologists to study the history and structure of the natural sciences and other
disciplines. For example, scientific and scholarly literatures have been
"mapped" through document co-citation. Two publications that are often jointly
cited by later publications are placed near each other on a pictorial map of
intellectual space. Writings that are frequently co-cited with many of the other
22. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.. 16 (1913).
23. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12.
24. See infra commentary accompanying note 120.
25. 2 E. GARFIELD, ESSAYS OF AN INFORMATION SCIENTIST 396-98 (1977); R. MERTON, ON THE
SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 218-19 (1965); R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCrURE 27-28, 35-38 (1968).
26. Moravcsik, Measures of Scientific Growth, 2 RES. POL'Y 266 (1973).
27. Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and
the Tiple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L, REv. 207, 224 n.108 (1989) (citing Shapiro, Legal Data Bases and
Historical Lexicography, 3 LEGAL REFERENcE SERVICES Q., Winter 1983, at 85). I have explored the utility
of such historical-lexicographical researches in a number of articles: Shapiro, A Computer Search for the
Origin of Executive Privilege, 59 AM. SPEECH 60 (1984); Shapiro, supra; Shapiro, Linguistic Applications
of LEXIS and IVESTLAW, 30 JURIMMDCS L 147 (1990).
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documents in a subject area are placed in the center of the map of that subject,
while writings less frequently co-cited appear at its periphery. On a large
diagram of a discipline, subfields themselves emerge as core or fringe, and, on
the largest map, disciplines are connected and scholarship as a whole is out-
lined.'
Another application of citation data is the compilation of rankings of
journals based on straight citation counts or "impact factors" (the average
number of citations received by articles published in a particular journal).
Authors too have been evaluated through tabulation of citations to their writ-
ings. Citation counts have been utilized in assessing scholars' work for purposes
of grant awards, tenure, or promotion decisions.29
Those using citation data for evaluative purposes have justified such use
by pointing to research demonstrating a high correlation between the total of
citations to a scientist's or scholar's writings and judgments by peers of the
"'productivity,' 'significance,' 'quality,' 'utility,' 'influence,' 'effectiveness,'
or 'impact' of scientists and their scholarly products.""0 One investigator has
gone so far as to say that "citations and peer ratings appear to be virtually the
same measurement.
'31
Almost all citation analysts, however, are careful to note that citation counts
measure a "quality" which is socially defined, reflecting the utility of the
writing in question to other scholars, rather than gauging its intrinsic merit.
Furthermore, the value of the counts may be lessened by limitations in the
accuracy, coverage, or time-frame of the source data. For these reasons and
others, evaluative use of citation analysis has remained controversial. 32
Even with their acknowledged limitations, citation counts are attractive as
relatively objective tools for assessing scholarly impact. They can be used not
only to gauge the impact of a given author or writing, but also to identify which
writings are the most frequently cited, taken to be a rough measure of the
writings which have had the most extensive impact.
28. Co-citation studies can also focus on authors or journals, rather than documents, as the units of
analysis. For more extensive discussion of co-citation analysis, see E. GARFIELD, CrrATION INDEXING-ITS
THEORY AND APPLICATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITmES 98-147 (1979); Bellardo, The Use
ofCo-Citations to Study Science, 2 LIBR. RES. 231 (1980-81); Small, Co-Citation in the Scientific Literature:
A New Measure of the Relationship between Two Documents, 24 J. AM. Soc'Y FOR INFO. SCL 265 (1973);
Small & Sweeney, Clustering the Science Citation Index Using Co-Citations: L A Comparison of Methods,
7 SCIENTOMATRICS 391 (1985); Small, Sweeney & Greenlee, Clustering the Science Citation Index Using
Co-Citations: II. Mapping Science, 8 SCIENTOMETRlCS 321 (1985).
29. See E. GARFIELD, supra note 28, for a detailed discussion of citation analysis applications.
30. Lawani & Bayer, Validity of Citation CriteriaforAssessing the Influence of Scientific Publications:
New Evidence with Peer Assessment, 34 . AM. SOC'Y FOR INFO. Sci. 59, 61 (1983).
31. Bensman, Journal Collection Management as a Cumulative Advantage Process, 46 COLLEGE &
RES. LIBR. 13, 23 (1985).
32. See generally E. GARFIELD, supra note 28, at 240-52.
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B. Origins
There is a long history of citation studies in law. Although information
science literature33 frequently repeats the assertion that the earliest instance
of citation analysis was a 1927 study by Paul L.K. Gross and E.M. Gross'
tabulating references in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, legal
citation analysis antedates this "first" by at least thirty-three years. The Report
of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association in 1895
noted that:
Among publishers, Mr. [Charles C.] Soule, of the Boston Book Compa-
ny, is pre-eminent in his knowledge of legal bibliography. In his circular
for November, 1894, he gives a table showing the comparative frequen-
cy of citation of the Federal, English and State decisions, outside of
their own respective jurisdictions, compiled from the last official volume
of each prior to 1894.
35
A more elaborate citation analysis appeared in the American Bar Associa-
tion report for 1895. Frank C. Smith, the Secretary of the Committee on Law
Reporting, compiled a large table setting forth the number of cases reported
from each American court of last resort from June 1, 1894 to May 31, 1895
and the number of times each state and federal court cited each other state and
federal court, as well as English courts, during that period.36 Smith also com-
puted the total number of citations in the cases examined, the total of citations
to a court's own precedents, the total to other courts' decisions, the totals of
citations by common-law tribunals to courts of other common-law states and
of code states, and similarly for code-state tribunals.37 He even determined
which part of the last-mentioned totals were citations in support of procedural
points.38 Smith's prodigious number-crunching was not an idle exercise: he
marshalled his statistics to demonstrate that the torrential outpouring of reports
volumes could be stemmed by limiting judicial citations to "cases from their
own reports covering the same [nonprocedural] ground" 39 and that the practic-
es of common-law and code states were not as divergent as had been sup-
33. See, e.g., Hertzel, History of the Development of Ideas in Bibliometrics, in 42 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 144, 159-60 (1987).
34. Gross & Gross, College Libraries and Chemical Education, 66 SCIENCE 385 (1927).
35. Report of the Committee on Library and Legal Literature, in REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR AssOCIAION 53 (1895). The table, ranking the jurisdictions by
number of citations to them by other courts, was reprinted in the Virginia report. Id. at 54.
36. Report of the Committee on Law Reporting, in REPORT OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCATION 343, 366-B (1895).
37. Id. at 364-65.
38. Id. at 365.
39. Id.
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The application of sophisticated citation analysis to law has barely begun
to be explored. In scientific disciplines, publications and their interconnections
are byproducts of the research enterprise. In law, publications and their inter-
connections are close to the heart of the discipline. The citation analysis
techniques developed in studying the natural and social sciences, now estab-
lished methods for the historiography and sociology of science, possess even
greater potential for assisting the historiography and sociology of law.
The principal sources of citation data in the natural sciences, social sciences,
and humanities are the indexes published by the Institute for Scientific Informa-
tion (ISI), a company founded by Eugene Garfield. Garfield is the leading
exponent and the virtual inventor of sophisticated citation analysis. ISI publish-
es, and offers in electronic form as well, the Science Citation Index, the Social
Sciences Citation Index, and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index. Each of
these lists, for a given publication, the articles from indexed journals that cite
it. Because of their wide coverage and the close subject relationship between
citing and cited documents, the ISI indexes serve as extraordinarily powerful
and intensive subject indexes to the worldwide scholarly literature of virtually
all disciplines, and have become basic research tools.
The Social Sciences Citation Index includes over one hundred legal or law-
related periodicals within its coverage, making it a remarkably powerful legal
research tool. Another index source for legal citation data is the Shepard's
Citations system of indexes, especially Shepard's Law Review Citations. The
Shepard's "citators" for court decisions, by far the oldest citation indexes,
supplied the inspiration for Garfield's application of the citation indexing
principle to scientific and scholarly literature.42 Shepard's supplements the
40. Id. at 366.
41. See, e.g., R. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990); Caldeira, The Transmission of
Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCL REV. 178 (1985); Daniels, "Far
Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October
Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAW LiaR. J. 1 (1983); Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright & Wheeler, State
Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); Johnson, Citations to
Authority in Supreme Court Opinions, 7 LAw & POL'Y 509 (1985); Landes & Posner, Legal Change,
Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367 (1980); Landes & Posner, Legal
Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 249 (1976); Maggs, Concerning the
Extent to which the Law Review Contributes to the Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (1930);
Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954); Merryman, Toward a Theory of
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950,1960, and
1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCL REV. 295 (1936); Sirico
& Margulies, supra note 6.
42. For an historical account of Garfield's development of the principle of Shepard's into citation
indexes for the sciences and humanities, see E. GARFIELD, supra note 28, at 6-18.
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SSCI for periodical literature and provides an enormous body of citation data
for case law and other primary legal sources.
Perhaps the most interesting use of legal citation data to date is in Richard
Delgado's The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature4 3 Delgado studied citation counts and concluded that "I have dis-
covered a ... scholarly tradition. It consists of white scholars' systematic
occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars from, the central areas of civil
rights scholarship. The mainstream writers tend to acknowledge only each
others' work."' His evidence of exclusion of nonwhites and women from the
universe of civil rights citations is more impressionistic than quantitative, but
Delgado's work suggests an important avenue for future research. Patterns of
citation inclusion, omission, and emphasis create a canon of accepted thought
which may be analyzed through techniques developed by information scientists.
Co-citation analysis offers intriguing possibilities for mapping legal scholar-
ship or case law.45 The links between law and other disciplines, such as eco-
nomics or literary criticism, could be diagrammed based on patterns of scholarly
citation. The internal structure and external connections of intellectual move-
ments such as critical legal studies could be illuminated through investigation
of co-citation." "Research fronts" (subject areas of significant activity) of
legal scholarship could be identified. The historical development of areas of
legal thought could be charted by means of network diagrams showing citation
connections between more recent and older writings, or time series of co-
citation maps. Citation connections among publications are likely to be correlat-
ed with social links among authors, so that the historical and structural insights
of citation analysis could provide grist for a sociology of legal scholarship.
Investigators of legal citation have available to them tools superior to those
in other disciplines, making possible correspondingly richer results. Beyond the
SSCI and Shepard's, the full-text online databases, LEXIS and WESTLAW,
offer the capability of retrieving references to any type of source by locating
mentions of the name or bibliographic citation of the source in the documents
included in the database. LEXIS and WESTLAW also offer highly flexible
capabilities for retrieving documents in which a desired combination of citations
to different sources is present. The systems can also retrieve documents in
which a citation is accompanied by desired words. This kind of citation/word
search can be used to limit results to documents where a particular aspect of
the cited source is referred to or where the cited source is referred to in a
particular context.47 It may also be possible, using key-word searches, to focus
43. 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
44. Id. at 566.
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. Id.
47. See F. SHAPIRO, LEXIS: THE COMPLETE USER'S GUIDE 126-36 (1989) for a thorough discussion
of using LEXIS as a citator;, analogous techniques are applicable to WESTLAW.
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on the verbal context surrounding citations in order to isolate "negative cita-
tions" (citations for the purpose of criticism), citations in which the cited source
is characterized in a particular way, or citations in which two or more cited
sources are associated or contrasted with each other in a particular fashion. 8
II. THE COMPNILATION
My own forays into citation study have consisted of a 1985 article listing
the fifty most-cited law review articles since 1947,4 1 followed by an anthology
reprinting the most-cited law review articles of all time.50 The original article
used Shepard's Law Review Citations as the basis for a ranking of the post-
1947 law review articles most often cited within other law review articles. For
the anthology, I supplemented this Shepard's ranking with data supplied to me
by Eugene Garfield from the Social Sciences Citation Index database. The SSCI
data enabled me to include the most-cited pre-1947 articles and the most-cited
articles from certain journals not covered by Shepard's, such as the Journal of
Law and Economics,5 resulting in a comprehensive anthology.
The present compilation of the most-cited articles from The Yale Law
Journal is based on data drawn entirely from the citation database of the Social
Sciences Citation Index. The SSCI is a superior resource to Shepard's for this
purpose because the ISI data include citations to older articles, citations to all
types of articles (notes, comments, book reviews, and memorials as well as
"leading articles"), and citations appearing in all types of articles.52 Like
Shepard's, the Social Sciences Citation Index examines over one hundred law
reviews for citations, but, unlike Shepard's, the SSC1 also includes citations to
legal articles appearing in any of approximately 1,300 social science journals.
53
It seems fitting, given the strong tradition of interdisciplinary orientation at the
Yale Law School and The Yale Law Journal, to take citations in a broad range
of forums into account in compiling a roster of the Journal's most-cited articles.
48. Searching for the "introductory signals" which are standardized tokens of citation purpose in legal
writing may be useful. Such signals include accord, see, cf., compare, contra, but see, but cf., and see
generally.
49. Shapiro, supra note 8.
50. F. SHAPIRO, THE MosT-CrIED LAW REVIEW ARTICLES (1987). This anthology is published by
William S. Hein and Company.
51. Other important periodicals covered by the Social Sciences Citation Index, but not by Shepard's
Law Review Citations, include Journal of Legal Studies, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review,
Law and Social Inquiry, Administrative Law Review, Journal ofLegal Education, Law andHuman Behavior,
Law and Society Review, and Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
52. Shepard's Law Review Citations includes only leading articles in both its "cited" and "citing"
coverage.
53. The SSCI's scope encompasses anthropology, area studies, business, communication, criminology,
economics, education, geography, history, industrial and labor relations, law, library and information science,
linguistics, philosophy, political science, psychiatry, psychology, public administration, public health, social
work, sociology, statistics, urban studies and planning, and women's studies, among other fields.
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ISI generously provided me with a printout listing all Yale Law Journal
articles receiving at least ten citations in the Social Sciences Citation Index
database for 1966-1986. 1 then manually examined the 1956-1965 Cumulation
of the SSCI and the individual volumes for 1987, 1988, January-April 1989,
and May-August 1989 to complete the data.
Table I sets forth the thirty most-cited articles from The Yale Law Journal,
based on the Social Sciences Citation Index through August 1989. The articles
are ranked by number of citations received within other articles.
This list of most-cited articles is undoubtedly influenced by some chrono-
logical biases. Older articles are helped by the fact that they have had more
time to accumulate citations, but hurt by the absence of pre-1956 citations in
the source data. More recent articles are helped by the greater volume of
periodical literature and greater incidence of footnoting in their era,54 increas-
ing their opportunities for citation. The most recent articles, those from the
1980's, are still at the beginning of their citation histories and, in all but one
instance,55 have not yet had time to qualify for such a list.
Because of the above-mentioned biases against older articles, I have made
special note at the end of Table I of two articles whose citation totals are not
among the thirty highest, but which undoubtedly would have qualified had the
data extended further back in time. The inclusion of these articles by Wesley
N. Hohfeld and William 0. Douglas (with George E. Bates) also helps to add
historical balance to the list, which is dominated by articles from the 1960's
and 1970's. Similarly, I have included Harold D. Lasswell's and Myres S.
McDougal's Legal Education and Public Policy and Karl N. Llewellyn's What
Price Contract?, two older articles ranked twenty-second and twenty-eighth,
along with the higher-ranking articles for which commentaries are printed.
I have supplemented the information in Table I with a Table II enumerating
the ten articles (actually eleven because of a tie) which have received the most
citations over approximately the past five years. The numbers appearing in
Table II are the totals of citations in the Social Sciences Citation Index for the
inclusive period of January 1985 to August 1989. Table II represents a snapshot
of Yale Law Journal articles with exceptional contemporary impact, as opposed
to Table I's long-term cumulative record. The second table is, in addition, a
means for drawing attention to 1980's articles that, although precluded by their
recency from ranking among the thirty highest overall, are being extensively
cited.
There is another bias inherent in citation ranking. Some topics have a far
larger scholarly literature than others, resulting in much greater citation potential
54. One researcher found that footnote usage in a sample of American law review articles from 1978
was 48% greater than in a 1928 sample and 61% greater than in 1958. Wheeler, The Bottom Lines: Fifty
Years of Legal Footnoting in Review, 72 LAW LBR. L 245, 251 (1979).
55. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE U. 1063 (1981).
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for an article in a popular subject area than for one in an area less frequented
by law reviews. Ashbel G. Gulliver's and Catherine J. Tilson's Classification
of Gratuitous Transfers,56 for example, is a classic article in the law of trusts,
but its citation count is modest because the volume of law review literature on
trusts is modest. The list of the thirty most-cited Yale Law Journal articles leans
heavily towards public law, particularly constitutional law; about a dozen of
the articles may be categorized as constitutional in focus. No topical area other
than constitutional law has more than three representatives.
It is clear, then, that my roster should be viewed as a list of high-impact
articles rather than a definitive enumeration of influence, of significance, or of
anything else. Even with this caveat, however, a perusal of the attributes of the
listing and the listees may be of interest.
There are forty-one authors included in Table I, counting coauthors sepa-
rately and counting individuals twice if two articles by them appear. The
scholars who have two articles are Guido Calabresi, John Hart Ely, Thomas
I. Emerson, Charles A. Reich, and Joseph L. Sax.
57
Of the forty-one authors, twenty-three of them identified their primary
affiliation at the time of publication as Yale Law School. Three of these
(Barbara A. Brown, Gail Falk, and Ann E. Freedman) were students at the time.
Other academic affiliations were: University of California-Berkeley, two
authors; Columbia, two; Duke, two (one of them, William R. Perdue, Jr., a
student); Harvard, two (one of whom, George E. Bates, was a faculty member
at the Business School rather than the Law School); and University of Colora-
do, Indiana University, Michigan, New York University, Stanford, and Univer-
sity of Utah, one each. Four of the authors were not academics at the time of
publication: Edgar S. Cahn was a member of the Connecticut Bar, Jean C. Cahn
was an attorney with the Legal Advisor's Office of the Department of State,
Laurent B. Frantz was an editor of the Bancroft-Whitney Company, and J.
Skelly Wright was a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.
Nineteen of the authors attended Yale Law School. Other law schools
attended were: Harvard, five authors; University of Chicago, three; Columbia,
three; University of California-Berkeley, Duke, University of Freiburg, Loyola
(New Orleans), University of Minnesota, University of Mississippi, Stanford,
and University of Tennessee, one each. Three authors, George E. Bates, Ward
S. Bowman, Jr., and Harold D. Lasswell, were, respectively, a finance profes-
sor, an economist, and a political scientist and had no formal legal training.
56. Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.. 1 (1941).
57. Another of Calabresi's articles, coauthored with Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L REV. 1089 (1972), qualified for my list of the fifty
most-cited articles from all journals. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 1550. Sax too had a non-Yale Law Journal
publication on the all-journal list: The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Shapiro, supra note 8, at 1551.
1460 [Vol. 100: 1449
1991] Most-Cited Articles 1461
Of special interest in the context of a centennial is the fact that nine of the
individual authors (accounting for twelve of the articles) were members of The
Yale Law Journal. The Law Journal alumni are:
Barbara A. Brown, Editor, 1970-71
Edgar S. Cahn, Article and Book Review Editor, 1962-63
Guido Calabresi, Note Editor, 1957-58
John Hart Ely, Note and Comment Editor, 1962-63
Thomas I. Emerson, Editor-in-Chief, 1930-31
Abraham S. Goldstein, Article Editor, 1948-49
Joseph Goldstein, Article and Book Review Editor, 1951-52
Karl N. Llewellyn, Editor-in-Chief, 1918-19
Charles A. Reich, Editor-in-Chief, 1951-52
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 1449
TABLE I
MOST-CITED ARTICLES FROM
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL58
1. 667 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. 733 (1964).
2. 404 William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
3. 380 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ.
920 (1973).
4. 332 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.
877 (1963).
5. 323 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE LU. 1205 (1970).
6. 293 Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LI. 36 (1964).
7. 267 Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499 (1961).
8. 261 Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J 543 (1960).
9. 236 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(Parts 1 & 2), 46 YALE LU. 52, 373 (1936-37).
10. 216 Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319 (1957).
10. 216 Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE LJ. 1245 (1965).
12. 215 Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
13. 214 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. 950 (1979).
14. 211 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L. 663 (1974).
15. 198 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L. 1055 (1972).
15. 198 Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J 221 (1973).
17. 191 Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 (1971).
18. 180 Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. 1424 (1962).
19. 174 Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J 517 (1966).
20. 167 Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L. 871 (1971).
21. 166 Charles L Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J 421
(1960).
22. 158 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J 203 (1943).
23. 150 J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.L 575 (1972).
24. 141 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19 (1957).
1462
58. The column of numbers on the left is the ranking. The second column is the total number of
citations in the Social Sciences Citation Index from 1956 through August 1989 inclusive. For two-part
articles, the number given is the total of citations to the first parL
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25. 140 Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Calm, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE
L.J 1317 (1964).
26. 139 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE UJ. 475 (1968).
27. 138 Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE LI. 775 (1965), 75 YALE LI. 373 (1966).
28. 135 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?--An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704
(1931).
29. 129 Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifica-
tion of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE LI. 1078 (1968).
30. 128 Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE U. 1063 (1981).
ADDMIONAL OLDER ARTICLES
127 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.I. 16 (1913).
107 William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE
LI. 171 (1933).
The Yale Law Journal
TABLE II
MOST-CITED ARTICLES FROM
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Citations from January 1985-August 198919
59. The column of numbers on the left is the ranking for this time-period. The next column is the total
number of citations in the Social Sciences Citation Index from January 1985 through August 1989 inclusive.
1. -114 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. 950 (1979).
2. 105 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.. 733 (1964).
3. 99 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.L
1013 (1984).
4. 89 Frank R. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
LJ. 698 (1982).
4. 89 Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1 (1984).
6. 76 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wofy. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973).
7. 73 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.L 1073 (1984).
8. 68 Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.L 1063 (1981).
9. 61 Wtlliam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
LJ. 663 (1974).
10. 58 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.L 1205 (1970).
10. 58 Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ofProcess-Based Constitutional Theories,




Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J 733 (1964) (ranked first).
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965) (ranked tenth).
Commentary by Charles A. Reich,
Marshall P. Madison Visiting Professor of Law,
University of San Francisco Law School.
Editor-in-Chief, The Yale Law Journal, 1951-52.
I call this form of wealth "property" because it is inseparable from
citizenship and personhood. I cannot accept the idea of a propertyless
people in a democratic society. Yet that is what will happen if we limit
the concept of property to its traditional forms.
Charles A. Reich
The New Property and Individual Rights and Social Welfare were both
responses to the rise of the administrative state. I felt that this major trans-
formation of the American system required an equivalent revision of law. For
the first time in American history, the state had become powerfully involved
in the economic life of every individual and business, as well as the manager
of an ever greater area of public resources. The New Property addressed the
question of substantive and procedural rights in the new system. As new forms
of wealth, from welfare to television broadcast licenses, are created by the state,
what kind of protection should they be given by the law?
Individual Rights and Social Welfare was a call for the development, in the
law schools and the profession, of a field of "public interest law," for unrepre-
sented but vital interests affected by the managerial state.
Both articles were cited as support for the landmark decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly,' establishing constitutional protection for welfare benefits. This was
the first of a series of court decisions dealing with "new property interests"
spanning the spectrum from government employment, management of public
lands, allocation of highway funds, and professional licensing to food stamps
and foster care of children. "New Property Law" has become a standard part
of the casebooks and law school curricula in property, constitutional law, and
administrative law. In addition, the fields of welfare law, family law, employ-
ment law, health law, and environmental law all have been influenced by new
property issues. I expect this trend to continue as the legal system becomes an
ever more important source of benefits and security for rich and poor alike.
60. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Several of our most important ongoing public policy debates concern new
property issues. The problem of poverty raises the question of "entitlements"
(a word whose current usage was established by Individual Rights and Social
Welfare) and whether there is a constitutional right to shelter, subsistence,
health insurance, and other minimum necessities of life. The use of government
benefits as devices to extend the regulatory power of the federal government
over the states and individuals has led to a debate over "unconstitutional
conditions." For example, can federal highway funds be conditioned on agree-
ment by the states to raise the drinking age, a subject admittedly beyond direct
federal regulation?61 Can food stamps be denied to strikers and their fami-
lies? 62 There is a growing debate in employment law over "property rights"
in jobs.63 As competition for use of the national forests and other parts of the
public domain increases, the debate over recognizing individual or group envi-
ronmental interests grows.6" The rights of public employees, teachers, students,
and members of the armed services have been a source of ever-widening
debate.65 In private law areas there are also ongoing controversies, such as the
debate over whether a spouse's professional degrees or licenses should be
considered marital "property" in divorce actions.
66
The rise of vigorously contending schools of legal theory has meant that
new property has been a focus of much jurisprudential debate. The New Proper-
ty has been attacked by both the left and the right. Scholars of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement have asserted that new property rights are illusory
promises to the powerless, made by the liberal establishment to quiet discontent
by victims of the system. Conservatives have objected to new property rights
as an interference with the free market and an unjustifiable attempt to
"constitutionalize" the welfare state. For feminist legal scholars, new property
theory has provided a foundation for asserting a legal status for services and
values such as child care that have traditionally received scant legal protection.
And the struggle for anti-discrimination protection by feminists, racial minori-
ties, and gay-lesbian advocates has taken as its underlying premise the idea that
educational credentials, jobs, and positions of power within the system are
61. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditioning highway funds, as indirect encourage-
ment to obtain uniformity in States' drinking ages, is valid use of congressional spending power).
62. See Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (statute denying new or increased food stamp
allotment to employee on strike does not violate First Amendment).
63. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (state University professor hired for one year
did not have constitutional right to statement of reasons and hearing on university's decision not to rehire
him for another year).
64. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (free exercise clause
does not prohibit government from permitting construction of road through portion of national forest
traditionally used by American Indian tribe for religious purposes).
65. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students facing temporary suspension from public school
have liberty and property interests protected by Fourteenth Amendment due process); Dronenberg v. Zeeh,
741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding discharge from Navy for homosexual conduct).
66. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985) (husband's
license to practice medicine is "marital property" in divorce action).
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interests deserving constitutional protection. Civil liberties lawyers have fought
an array of cases in which government benefits or licenses have been denied
or revoked as a way of curbing political dissent-without resort to the criminal
justice system with its accompanying safeguards.
The growth of public interest law during the past twenty-five years is well
known and need not be detailed here. For example, there was no recognized
field of welfare law when Individual Rights and Social Welfare was published
in 1966; today welfare law is an established part of the law school curriculum
and an important area of the profession, providing an essential service to many
hitherto powerless individuals as well as an outlet for the most dedicated and
idealistic members of the legal profession. In many other areas, notably the
environment, public interest law has provided badly-needed balance in the
administrative state.
As I look back on The New Property and Individual Rights and Social
Welfare today there is nothing of importance that I regret (except the use of
the masculine pronoun), but much that I would expand. Instead of an exclusive
focus on economic interests deriving from government, I would now place
equal emphasis on private employment and interests deriving from private
corporations. Today corporations and government are virtually indistinguishable
when it comes to their leadership, objectives, and power over individuals.
Corporate new property such as pensions and health benefits is just as important
as government new property. I believe that many jobs in the private sector
should receive the same protection as government jobs. Academic tenure
provides a good model. Originally justified as necessary to protect academic
freedom, tenure has long since outlived this justification and has become
primarily a form of job security. As such, it has demonstrated the value of
employment security and should be extended to similar jobs in the rest of the
private sector, because a workforce dominated by fear of dismissal for political
or personal nonconformity is a major threat to the survival of our democratic
values. The worker and the citizen can no longer realistically be compartmental-
ized; when the worker is unprotected, the citizen is endangered.
With respect to entitlements for those in need, today I would argue that the
due process clause guarantee against deprivation of life, liberty, or property
must be interpreted to mean that there is an affirmative obligation on the part
of the state to provide shelter, health care, care for children and the aged, and
minimum sustenance to all persons. We now live in a managed economy.;
economic power is concentrated as never before, and decisions are centralized
and beyond individual and even democratic influence. The Federal Reserve can
throw people out of jobs and homes. Ordinary people have lost control over
their economic fates. Free land and other sources of support for the unattached
individual have virtually disappeared. Exclusion from the system has become
a form of internal exile, and dispossessed people such as the homeless have
been deprived of the means of survival. In this context, the command of due
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process can no longer be satisfied by merely leaving people alone. In a centrally
managed economy, the state must take affirmative steps to see that no one is
deprived of basic economic support 7
I would also extend new property thinking to embrace environmental rights.
We should all have a right to a safe, clean, and intact natural environment, a
right to be free of toxic threats, a right to participate in the management
decisions concerning the public domain. Pollution of the ocean, or lumbering
the last ancient forests, or commercial development of the national parks should
be held to involve "new property rights" because these actions have a direct
impact upon the quality of our lives and are part of each person's share in the
commonwealth. 8
There has been considerable academic criticism of my use of the concept
of "property" to describe non-traditional economic interests. I enjoy this contro-
versy, but I continue to insist that property is not merely a technical concept
but an essential support of constitutional liberty. To the Framers, property was
equivalent to economic independence, which in turn was the foundation of all
other freedoms. I think it was a mistake to separate economic and personal
liberty into unrelated categories governed by different rules, as the Supreme
Court has done since the New Deal. The distinction has proven unworkable;
all too often repression has taken the form of avoiding the criminal process in
order to "get people where it hurts"--i.e., by attacking their economic security.
More basically, new property represents the birthright of every individual.
I reject the idea that new property is value transferred to the needy from
another group in society; I call this form of wealth "property" because it is
inseparable from citizenship and personhood. I cannot accept the idea of a
propertyless people in a democratic society. Yet that is what will happen if we
limit the concept of property to its traditional forms. I believe it is better social
policy to allow and encourage the concept of property to evolve as society
changes, keeping the function of the property alive whatever the form.
Looking to the future, I see new property-public interest law thinking as
leading to an ecological view of our constitutional rights. Today the individual
needs comprehensive protection just as nature requires comprehensive protec-
tion. As individuals become excessively dependent upon large organizations,
many dangers to our society arise. There is no one with sufficient independence
to correct the system when it goes wrong, as it must inevitably go wrong from
time to time. This results in political stalemate, a system that is frozen and
unable to change or adapt even to the most urgent needs. Submergence of the
individual in organizations produces a vast passivity and apathy, a lack of
courage and vision. When people are dependent, they lose the ability to control
their own lives, and this results in out-of-control behavior from drug abuse to
67. Cf. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990) (notion of minimal entitlements obligatory under Constitution).
68. See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J 1227 (1966).
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violence. The insecurity of dependent people leads to widespread repression
that threatens our tradition of liberty. Many of these evils are similar to those
which caused the revolutions in Eastern Europe, directed against states which
were Socialist in name only, but in essence bureaucratic and administrative like
our own.
Under an ecological view, the individual would receive protection not
merely through a series of disparate, historically-based rights, but through a
functional concept of the individual's role and domain in a democratic society.
Life, liberty, and property would be seen not as separate entities, but as the
boundary markers of an "individual sector" where the powers of the individual
would limit and balance the powers of the state.
The Yale Law Journal
William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 7 1099 (1960) (ranked second).
Commentary by George L. Priest,
John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics
and Director, Program in Civil Liability,
Yale Law School.
Prosser's article became central because, of the assortment of articles
floating above the legal surface at the time, Assault upon the Citadel
was perfectly positioned to catch the wave of enthusiasm for greater
manufacturer liability.
George L. Priest
It should not be surprising that Prosser's Assault upon the Citadel is among
the most frequently cited articles in The Yale Law Journal. Prosser's article at
once predicted, justified, and outlined the implementation of the shift from war-
ranty law to strict liability for product defects which, along with Brown v.
Board of Education,69 constitutes one of the two most sudden and momentous
changes in our legal regime of the past century.
Prosser's article became heavily cited, however, not because its ideas were
influential, nor, surely, because it initiated a school of thought. Assault upon
the Citadel is hard to distinguish in content from an assortment of articles
published in the late-1950s criticizing the regime of warranty law for consumer
products and urging that the nearly uniform adoption of automatic liability for
food poisoning be extended to other consumer goods.7" Rather, Prosser's
article became central because, of the assortment of articles floating above the
legal surface at the time, Assault upon the Citadel was perfectly positioned to
catch the wave of enthusiasm for greater manufacturer liability. Prosser's article
condemning warranty law and proposing automatic consumer recovery for
product defects was published almost simultaneously with the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,7 1 invali-
dating warranty law and providing for automatic consumer recovery for product
defects.72 Shortly thereafter, Assault upon the Citadel was propelled even
further by the decision of the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
70. See e.g., Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L REV. 928 (1957); James, General Products -Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957); Noel, Manufacturers ofProducts-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 963 (1957); Wilson, Products Liability (Parts 1 & 2), 43 CALIF. L. REv. 614, 809 (1955).
71. 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
72. I present the details of the publication timing of Assault upon the Citadel and Henningsen in Priest,
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,
14 J. L GAL STUDIES 461, 506-07 (1985).
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Power Products, Inc.,73 defining a new standard of strict tort liability for
defective products which Prosser, though not the New Jersey Supreme Court,
had recommended.
I have earlier remarked upon the simultaneity of prediction in Assault upon
the Citadel and confirmation in Henningsen as equivalent to the delivery of
Einstein's relativity paper to its readers exactly during the 1919 eclipse of the
sun.74 In retrospect, this description does not adequately distinguish Prosser's
ambition from his reception. Readers at the time may well have been amazed
to see Prosser's predictions in The Yale Law Journal appear within months in
the pages of the New Jersey Reports. But Prosser viewed himself not as a
positive scientist whose theory generates predictions, but as a reformer whose
persistence may generate change. Prosser had been predicting the imminent
demise of warranty law and the adoption of strict products liability as part of
his propaganda in favor of reform, repeatedly-in treatise (1941), article (1943),
treatise (next edition, 1955), and article (1960)--for almost two decades7
And in Assault upon the Citadel he finally got lucky. A better description of
Prosser in Assault upon the Citadel is that of a Jeremiah who finds that he is
finally getting an audience as the earthquake begins.
The subsequent success of Assault upon the Citadel, however, was hardly
accidental. Prosser exploited Henningsen and Greenman, his commanding
authority in the field, and his position as Reporter for the ALI Restatement of
Torts to cement the achievement and channel products law toward modern strict
liability. Prosser's initial hopes for legal change were modest. In now little-
remembered passages of Assault upon the Citadel, Prosser predicted that
expansion of the strict liability concept beyond cases involving food or skin
products would likely proceed slowly.76 Extension of the concept to allow
recovery by bystanders "may perhaps never come."" He admiringly quotes
at length from Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.8 recommending extension of strict liability to all consumer products, but
concludes gloomily, "[t]hus far there has been relatively little indication that
the time is yet ripe for what may very possibly be the law of fifty years
ahead."
79
Prosser progressively abandoned this conservatism, however, as, in 1961,
1962, and 1964 (following Greenman), he implored the ALI to adopt strict
liability, respectively, for food products, products for intimate bodily use (a
category including food), and finally all consumer products, defective and
73. 2 Cal.2d 57, 77 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
74. Priest, supra note 72, at 507.
75. See id. at 516-17.
76. Prosser, supra note 14, at 1139.
77. Id. at 1142.
78. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
79. Prosser, supra note 14, at 1120.
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unreasonably dangerous."0 Section 402A was adopted in 1964 accompanied
by extensive Comments drafted by Prosser, drawing examples-even taking
full paragraphs-from Assault upon the Citadel.
The accumulation of citations to Assault upon the Citadel came in the years
following the adoption of Section 402A. By this time, the world had accepted
its points; there surely was no new ground for the article to break. Instead,
Assault upon the Citadel climbed up the list of the most frequently cited
because of its convenience. It provided by far the most accessible summary of
the case law preceding Section 402A,1 which in turn seemed to provide the
strongest support for the new legal regime. Assault upon the Citadel, thus,
became at once the beacon and the bowsprit of the modern expansion of civil
liability that has so significantly changed tort law over the past thirty years.
80. A description of the ALI history appears in Priest, supra note 72, at 512-17.
81. Assault was distributed far more widely than the working drafts of section 402A that Prosser had
prepared for the ALL Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, April 7, 1961); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, April 16, 1962); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Tent.
Draft No. 10, April 20, 1964).
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John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (ranked third).
John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (ranked fifth).
Commentary by John Hart Ely,
Robert E. Paradise Professor of Law
and Senior Research Fellow,
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace,
Stanford University.
Note and Comment Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1962-63.
Of the two articles, Motivation is by far the more important contribu-
tion. Unfortunately, no evidence exists that anyone has read it.
John Hart Ely
There's a chance you missed the 1969 movie A Walk in the Spring Rain.
Most of the details have mercifully faded from memory, but the general plot
line was that Ingrid Bergman, temporarily resident in a pastoral mountain locale
and driven up the wall by her wearisome husband, resisted but finally suc-
cumbed to an affair with a virile local man-child-if he wasn't actually a
gamekeeper, he should have been-played by Anthony Quinn.
In order to keep the audience from simply dismissing Ms. Bergman as an
unsympathetic trollop, the husband, played by Fritz Weaver, had to be portrayed
as one pretty desiccated prune, and he was: they made him a professor. Not
just any professor would do, though-Indiana Jones is a professor-so they
made Fritz a professor of constitutional law. I always figured that that had
tedium pretty well cornered-until I received the fateful letter from Mr. Shapiro
telling me my place in the scheme of things. Third. Maybe fifth. Something
in that general range. Not something you're exactly tempted to put on your
r6sum6, but enough to rob you of the rationalization that your work is so
brilliant or controversial that others are afraid to cite it. Sentenced to a sabbati-
cal with me, Ms. Bergman would probably take up with the Hell's Angels.
Of the two articles, Motivation is by far the more important contribution.
Unfortunately, no evidence exists that anyone has read it. (True, it gets men-
tioned, but generally in string citations supporting the proposition that questions
of motivation are complicated and have spawned some literature.) There are
at least three reasons for this. The first is that the title doesn't begin to reveal
what the article is about. True, it's about the constitutional relevance of official
motivation. But it makes other general theoretical points as well, including the
insight that, the usual rhetoric notwithstanding, it is not the case that we either
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do or should enforce a background requirement that government choices be
rational. And it was an important first step toward a modest paradigm shift in
the analysis of constitutional suspiciousness to which my later work has also
contributed, from a victim perspective (who's getting screwed, and how) to a
perpetrator perspective (who made this allocation, and with what incentives).
Since it purports to explore the relevance of motive in essentially all areas
of constitutional law, Motivation necessarily attempts, albeit often briskly, to
identify the sorts of evils to which the document's various clauses are ad-
dressed, before attempting to say how motivation should fit into the analysis.
Thus it discusses not simply a wide range of equal protection problems, but,
among other things, the state action doctrine, the range of federal power,
congressional control of the jurisdiction of federal courts, congressional investi-
gations, and a host of First Amendment problems as well. The discussion of
the religion clauses, for example, is an important one, yet it is seldom even
mentioned in the voluminous subsequent literature on that subject. The reason
seems obvious: there isn't a hint of religion in the article's title, any more than
there is of the other topics I have mentioned.
There are at least two other reasons Motivation, while often cited-well,
fifth-is seldom read. One is that it is much too long (136 pages); the other
is that it is not very well written (especially the off-putting introductory summa-
ry I added during the editing process). I wrote it my second year in teaching.
("Hey, why wait? I'm a teacher now, and teachers write, and if you have to
clean up all of constitutional law before you can make your point, I guess that's
what you do. Does the school furnish a dictaphone?") Had I realized that Yale
was about to embark on a siege of not promoting anybody for a decade or so,
I wouldn't have been so cocky. In fact I suppose I'd have developed a block
of my own. Some would say the profession would be better off for that, but
I continue to believe that, despite its lack of discipline, Motivation is an impor-
tant piece. Fewer people should cite it; more people should read it.
Wages may have been more conspicuous politically-how many law review
articles get mentioned in presidential speeches?-but it is substantially less
important theoretically. I haven't yielded an inch on my criticism of Roe (which
isn't, as I have explained elsewhere, necessarily to say that the casq should now
be overruled). However, writing a convincing criticism of Roe v. Wade was
hardly an assignment requiring a rocket scientist. Merely a kamikaze pilot.
(Wages would surely rank first on any list of articles with which other academ-
ics have expressed agreement privately but never gotten around to doing so
publicly. Such a study is thus far lacking.)
Yet Wages gets cited a lot-well, third-and there is some evidence it
actually gets read as well. I'd learned some lessons in the intervening three
years. Wages is short. It is better written than Motivation (not that it was
written any more deliberately, but diatribe is an easier milieu). And since it
isn't about very much, the title was able comfortably to capture the subject.
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Finally, of course, abortion is a hot topic-or at any rate the Supreme Court
made it one.
If three and five were unsettling numbers, however, 1970 and 1973 were
more so, even causing me briefly to wonder whether I'd somehow missed my
own obituary. I quickly consulted my bibliography to make sure I'd published
some things since these two, and was relieved to learn that I had, albeit in other
forums. 2 In the context of this celebration, however-Dean Calabresi's vari-
ous communications to the alumni are calculated to instill the same
doubts-one is compelled to wonder whether, in the overall scheme of things,
publication anywhere other than in The Yale Law Journal really... well,
counts.
I leave you with one final thought: Cite this piece! I've still got an outside
shot at a low straight.
Fritz Weaver's kind of hand.83
82. A mistake I'm not likely to make again. In introducing the review-specific citation study, Mr.
Shapiro has created the academic equivalent of the frequent flier club.
83. Having implied some skepticism about citation studies, I should admit my awareness that Mr.
Shapiro's list-I'll even grant it can't be a complete coincidence-is a very distinguished one. And if you
promise not to tell-I have my reputation to think about-I was actually delighted to learn I was on it.
Reich, Prosser, and Emerson are men it is an honor to finish even close to: in fact two of them-I never
met Dean Prosser-were important influences on me not only as a scholar but also, I hope, as a person.
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Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (ranked fourth).
Commentary by Norman Dorsen,
Stokes Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law.
President, American Civil Liberties Union, 1976-1991.
Tom Emerson's article was exceptional because it had enormous influ-
ence despite the fact that its central thesis was not adopted.
Norman Dorsen
Tom Emerson's article was exceptional because it had enormous influence
despite the fact that its central thesis was not adopted. The thesis was that "the
essence of a system of freedom of expression lies in the distinction between
expression and action'" and that a major problem in First Amendment theory
is "to formulate [the distinction] in detail."85 Notwithstanding the sophisticated
way in which Emerson explored this question in the article and a subsequent
book,86 his approach was rejected for both analyti* and instrumental reasons.
The Supreme Court has essentially adopted Louis Henkin's conclusion that a
"constitutional distinction between speech and conduct is specious. Speech is
conduct, and actions speak."8" And those concerned with maximum protection
of free speech, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, balked at
Emerson's theory because of the fear that the uncertain line between speech
and conduct would be drawn by judges who were insensitive to First Amend-
ment values.
Nevertheless, Emerson's article has had an important influence. First, there
is the lingering impact of his four-part exposition of the reasons to protect free
speech: attainment of truth, participation in decisionmaking, the balance be-
tween stability and change, and especially the nonutilitarian justification of
individual self-fulfillment (which never has been expressed more effectively).
Franklyn Haiman, author of a leading First Amendment work,8" has said that
whether a scholar "simply accepts and reiterates that litany (Haiman), chooses
just one of them as the be-all and end-all (Baker, Redish), critiques all of them
(Schauer), or comes up with a new one (Blasi, Bollinger, Chevigny), I can't
84. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 955 (1963).
85. Id. at 917.
86. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). The article was published, without
most of its footnotes, as a book in 1966. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1966).
87. Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63,
79 (1968) (emphasis in original).
88. F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1981).
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think of anyone who either ignores the Emerson list or doesn't begin with
it.,89
A second legacy of the article is its recognition of intensely practical
reasons for protecting freedom of expression. The earlier works by Zechariah
Chafee and Alexander MeiklejohnP° did not focus on the everyday realities
of censorship. Moreover, they wrote in the 1940's, when judicial experience
with free speech cases was still modest. Emerson, on the other hand, took pains
to isolate the "[d]ynamics of [1limitation" in a wide variety of contexts. He
identified the "powerful forces that impel men toward the elimination of
unorthodox opinion," the "inherent difficulty of framing limitations on expres-
sion," the "apparatus required for administration and enforcement" (those
assigned the task "have or soon develop a tendency to pursue it with zeal"),
the fact that limitations on speech "are readily subject to distortion and to use
for ulterior purposes," and the "whole impact of restriction on the healthy
functioning of society."91 Practical insights infuse Emerson's analysis and have
become a regular feature of judicial opinions and scholarly articles. 92 A third
product of Emerson's article flows from his purpose in drawing a hard-edged
line between "action" and "expression"--to immunize as much speech as
possible from government restrictions that courts otherwise mightpermit under
the prevailing judicial standards of "bad tendency," "clear and present danger,"
"ad hoc balancing," and even the "absolute test." 93
Although Emerson's basic theory did not take hold, its influence may be
seen in the way that courts continue to distinguish between "content-based" and
"content-neutral" regulations. Significantly greater protection is accorded speech
that is singled out for its message than speech that is curbed because govern-
ment is pursuing other goals, such as reducing noise or beautifying high-
ways.94 The content-based/content-neutral distinction antedated Emerson's
article and its application has often been confusing. Nevertheless, like
Emerson's speech/action dichotomy, it sharply limits certain types of govern-
ment regulation of expression while permitting other types that directly reduce
the sum total of communication.
From a broader perspective, Toward a General Theory was merely one of
Tom Emerson's unmatched scholarly contributions to every sphere of civil
liberties, including free expression, academic freedom, privacy, the rights of
89. Letter from Professor Haiman to the Author (March 9, 1990).
90. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); A. MEKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT (1948).
91. Emerson, supra note 84, at 887-91.
92. E.g., Baker, UnreasonedReasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Tune, Place, and Manner
Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 937, 1013-18 (1983); Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases:
Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALO L REV. 175, 206-07, 217-18 (1983).
93. Emerson, supra note 84, at 908-16.
94. See D. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 77-78 (1984);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 789-804 (2d ed. 1988).
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women and racial minorities, fair legislative apportionment, and the struggle
for open and compassionate government.95
95. See Dorsen, Thomas Irwin Emerson, 85 YALE LJ. 463 (1976) (includes bibliography).
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Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (ranked
sixth).
Commentary by Carol M. Rose,
Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
[L]ike much interesting scholarship, the article set off a new scholarly
conversation, and we are still learning where that conversation will
lead. As a result, of course, the takings issue is even more of a
mess-but also a more interesting mess-than it was in 1964.
Carol M. Rose
Joseph Sax's 1964 article, "Takings and the Police Power," endeavored to
clarify the notoriously inconsistent and messy case law on governmental
"takings" of private property. It pointed to a fundamental divide between types
of governmental actions: takings issues, Sax argued, have seldom arisen where
governments act in an "arbitrage" capacity, mediating and settling rights among
property owners. On the other hand, when governments exercise an "enterprise"
function, they are more likely to act arbitrarily and in ways that raise takings
problems, and that may require compensation to affected owners.
What emerged as the most productive point in Sax's article was not the
arbitrage/enterprise distinction, which in some ways echoed older accounts,9
6
but rather the historical analysis in which he identified arbitrariness as the
touchstone of takings doctrine. Within three years, Frank Michelman addressed
the takings issue with another extremely widely-cited article.97 Michelman's
article sidelined the arbitrage/enterprise division, but powerfully analyzed the
question of arbitrariness, particularly as that issue relates to people's expecta-
tions about property. Drawing on Bentham and Rawls, Michelman pointed to
a convergence of fairness and utilitarian reasoning in our restraints on govern-
mental violation of property expectations.
Michelman's focus on expectations in turn inspired new takings scholarship.
One direction concentrated on the content of people's expectations about
property: Robert Ellickson98 and Bruce Ackerman99 explored property expec-
tations by analogy to a somewhat changeable ordinary language, while Richard
Epstein argued that property is akin to a "natural kind," with certain universal
96. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904) (distinguishing governmental actions that merely
suppressed harms from those that required benefits from private property owners).
97. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
98. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls,
40 U. CHL L. REV. 681 (1973).
99. B. ACKERIAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
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features that are always expected."° Another and more recent branch of the
expectations literature has suggested that takings compensation acts as a kind
of surrogate insurance. 10 1
In the meantime, Sax himself had begun to doubt his own "enterprise"
category. His second thoughts responded in some measure to three develop-
ments of the later 1960's: the emergence of the environmental movement; the
beginnings of a "public choice" literature;"° and the further evolution of his
own scholarship, especially his revival of the historic concept of a "public
trust" in natural resources."°r
In the earlier arbitrage/enterprise divide, Sax had envisioned "arbitrage" as
a governmental balancing between two more or less equal private competitors,
whereas he had seen governmental "enterprise" as potentially an uneven deal:
as an "enterpriser," government could stack the deck in the public's favor
against the individual owner. It was this latter point that Sax began to doubt.
By the late 1960's, the public choice and governmental "capture" literature was
already suggesting that small and well-organized groups could aggressively
promote their own intensely-felt interests-usually at the expense of interests
that might be more widespread, but that were also more diffuse and weakly-
held by individuals. These considerations seemed to suggest to Sax that the
deck might be stacked against the public, and that it was the responsibility of
our governmental institutions to protect the diffuse but widespread "public
rights" that might otherwise be sacrificed to private overreaching.
All this put governmental "enterprise" in a different light. In a 1971
revisitation of the takings issue,"° Sax suggested that it was proper for gov-
ernment to act positively in a way that simply protected these widespread and
diffuse "public rights" against private depredations. One sees Sax's change of
heart best in his altered attitude about wetlands, the protection of which he
classed negatively as an "enterprise" in 1964, but as a positive protection of
"public rights" in 1971.
Once again, Sax's revisitation spawned a cottage industry. First, numerous
writers have been attracted to the idea that government may act positively to
protect public rights, in the exercise of a "public trust."'' 5 Second, a number
of writers have followed Sax's lead in another historical direction, and have
suggested another realm of positive action for government, namely its provision
100. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
101. See, e.g., Fischel & Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic
Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988).
102. Important early works were 1. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1965),
and M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
103. Sax, supra note 57.
104. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J 149 (1971).
105. For a recent example, see Symposium: The Public Trust and the Waters of the American West:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19 ENVTL. L 425 (1989), and the literature cited therein.
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of a forum for the working out of "civic republican" self-government.106 Sax
himself has seen a connection between his own interest in public rights in
natural resources and public consciousness in communities, and has suggested
that communities as a whole might have rights that center on the common life
of the citizenry.107
All this of course has come a great distance from Sax's original 1964
takings article. But like much interesting scholarship, the article set off a new
scholarly conversation, and we are still learning where that conversation will
lead. As a result, of course, the takings issue is even more of a mess-but also
a more interesting mess-than it was in 1964.
106. See, e.g., Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Symposium:
Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 NW. L. R.
1 (1989).
107. Sax, Do Communities have Rights? The National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 499 (1984).
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Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (ranked seventh).
Commentary by Guido Calabresi,
Dean and Sterling Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
Note Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1957-58.
Many questions left unanswered in that class, and in torts literature
generally, like the reason for the "scope of employment" limitation on
master-servant liability, seemed to me easy ones from even a simplistic
economic perspective. Why, then, not look at torts law, indeed at all of
law, from that perspective and see what one might learn?
Guido Calabresi
The first impression I had on rereading Some Thoughts thirty or so years
after its publication, and thirty-five years after it was begun, is that much that
was novel then seems obvious today; the second (more self-serving) impression
is that it remains considerably more subtle in its appreciation of the limits of
economic analysis than much that followed it.
The article had its genesis in the fall of 1955, when I was a student in
Fleming James' Torts class. Many questions left unanswered in that class, and
in torts literature generally, like the reason for the "scope of employment"
limitation on master-servant liability, seemed to me easy ones from even a
simplistic economic perspective. Why, then, not look at torts law, indeed at all
of law, from that perspective and see what one might learn? Why not make that
perspective more subtle; why not go beyond the limits economists themselves
accepted, and see where that would lead?
The first full version of the article was submitted to The Yale Law Journal
as my draft "comment" in the competition for Law Journal Officers. Though
I was selected a "Note Editor," it was clear that my draft had disappointed the
outgoing board, which included people of unusual brilliance who today properly
dominate the profession. It was too complex and it didn't sound like law. This
cold reaction led to a happy result for me: instead of being published and
forgotten as an anonymous student comment, the manuscript was set aside to
reappear four years later, when I was a junior faculty member, as my first
article.
Perhaps there were new readers, or the times had changed. In any event,
the reaction was totally different. Ronald Coase's magisterial article, The
Problem of Social Cost, appeared some months later,108 as did Pietro
108. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). As Judge Richard Posner has
pointed outin his book, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 4 n.6 (1981), though Coase's article was properly dated
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Trimarchi's stunning book, RISCHIO E RESPONSABILITA OGGETrIVA, which was
published in Italy.101 Harry Kalven and Walter Blum attacked my article
brilliantly, but in precisely the way any author hopes to be criticized."1
Of course, many remained unaffected. At the Harvard Law School, it took
some ten years before the approach evoked significant response. While at the
Max Planck Institute in Hamburg, in 1965, my thesis was greeted icily by its
great Director, Professor Konrad Zweigert, who commented, "Very interesting,
very interesting, but of course you must realize it isn't legal scholarship." I
rather rudely retorted: "It soon will be." If anything, it was quickly to be too
much so!
I have one regret with respect to the article. An early version of it contained
a fairly full analysis of causal reciprocity which parallelled that which Coase
made so famous in The Problem of Social Cost. This draft was read by a distin-
guished economist who told me that I was quite wrong, citing, of course, Pigou.
Coase received the same reaction from Stigler and the whole of the University
of Chicago Economics establishment when he presented his manuscript at a
workshop there."' Like Coase, I was not convinced; indeed, I did not under-
stand the Pigovian reasoning. Unlike Coase, however, who stuck to his guns,
I was not sufficiently sure of myself (or of my economics) and so removed the
section. All that I left was a footnote, which, discussing the failure to charge
drivers for injuries to pedestrians, says:
In effect such a result would amount to a decision that automobile
accidents are more a true cost of walking and of living generally, than
of automobile driving. Actually they are probably a cost of both.
I have not, in this article, attempted to probe what influences our
decision that a particular "cost" is caused by one activity rather than
another. Clearly this is an important question. Indeed, it is the next step
in any thorough analysis of risk distribution. At this stage of analysis,
however, when we have not yet examined the need and the effect of
charging activities with those costs which all would agree they cause,
that step seems somewhat far removed.
112
That "next step" was not, of course, "far removed." My unwillingness to
include a Calabresi version of Coase's theorem marked the last time I ever
omitted something I thought correct as a result of criticism that I did not
understand. In one sense, the matter is of no importance. Coase's analysis was
so much more compelling than mine, and he understood its significance so
1960, it did not appear in print until later because the Journal of Law and Economics was several issues
behind. This explains why neither he nor I cited the other.
109. P. IMMARCHI, Rlscmio E RESPONSiBILrrA OGGmrnVA (1961).
Ill. See Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970,
26 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (1983).
112. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,506 n.24
(1961).
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much more than I did (witness my failure in a subsequent article to grasp fully
the total force of Coase's theorem 13), that it would seem that all that was
involved was the question of whether one or two people had the same insight
at the same time; surely a trivial issue.
Unfortunately, however, that is not all there is to it. In The Problem of
Social Cost, Coase presented his insight, and transaction costs analysis, from
a distinctly anti-interventionistic, laissez-faire perspective. My ideological
framework in the late '50s and '60s was very different (though nowhere near
as skeptical of markets as Coase's had been twenty-five years earlier, when he
wrote The Nature of the Firm)."4 Accordingly, my version of Coase's theo-
rem-like my whole article-served to justify intervention in order to assign
costs in a way that reduced transaction costs. Had it been published, it would
have been impossible for many to reject "Coase's Theorem" as mere "right-
wing" ideology, since a "liberal" version would have been available at the
creation. Similarly, those who tried to make of economic analysis of law a basis
for blindly supporting the status quo would have found their path more difficult.
The fact of the matter is that Coase's insight, like all lasting contributions,
transcended the politics of its author. Coase, of course, knew and appreciated
this fully. Others, however, did not; some still don't. Had I not been frightened
by an erroneous criticism, this fact would have been patently obvious and the
Coase Theorem might well have had both a fuller and a more intelligent
acceptance than it did.
Thirty years later the fundamental import of Coase's theorem is clearly
recognized, and the point is of antiquarian interest only. It remains true, howev-
er, that advances in scholarship are richest when they occur independently to
several people whose work imparts differing nuances to the insight. Hence my
regret.
113. See, Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216
(1965) (which does not understand why Coase's theorem, on its terms, must apply to long-run as well as
to short-run cost allocations). The error was noted and corrected in Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968).
114. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNmICA (ns.) 386 (1937). In retrospect one can see that
The Nature of the Firm is based on an insight analogous to that in The Problem of Social Cost. In The
Nature of the Firm, the insight explains why "command" or "collective" arrangements are frequently used
in lieu of market ones; in The Problem of Social Cost, it explains how markets frequently modify and correct
errors made by "command" or "collective" arrangements. The insight is enormously important and
essentially the same; it is perhaps no accident, however, that in 1937 Professor Coase was a socialist, while
in 1960 he was a libertarian.
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Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543
(1960) (ranked eighth).
Commentary by Joseph Goldstein,
Sterling Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
Article and Book Review Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1951-52.
About to land their plane, with the fuel needle quivering at empty, in
a dense fog that emergency field lights could not penetrate, Cabot (or
was it Cagney?) opined: "It looks like low visibility all the way. .. ."
At that moment I found the words I was looking for to characterize
police decisions not to enforce the criminal law.
Joseph Goldstein
I was watching a war movie starring Bruce Cabot (or was it Jimmy
Cagney?) as U.S. Air Force pilots. About to land their plane, with the fuel
needle quivering at empty, in a dense fog that emergency field lights could not
penetrate, Cabot (or was it Cagney?) opined: "It looks like low visibility all
the way... ." At that moment I found the words I was looking for to character-
ize police decisions not to enforce the criminal law. Out of that film and out
of confidential American Bar Foundation reports of day-to-day decisions of a
large metropolitan police force came my first signed Law Journal article,
vintage 1960, entitled: Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice."5
Some thirty years later, Yale Law librarian Fred Shapiro tells me that my
article ranked eighth on a list of most-cited Yale Law Journal Articles and asks
"What impact do you feel the article has had on other scholars, on the courts,
or on legislation? Have your views on the topic changed? Would you write the
article differently today?" I leave it to others to answer his first question. My
response to his second and third question is "No."
Before saying something about the current relevance of what I attempted
to do in the article, I wish to say that ranking by citation counts could become
an invidious virus in the world of scholarship. It bears no relationship to
scholarly merit. It is nondiscriminating in its discrimination. It is not even a
reliable indicator that the work cited was read, let alone understood by the citer.
But I suppose that at a time when law schools are ranked, like Miss Americas,
by a national periodical, it should come as no surprise that in partial celebration
of its 100th Anniversary The Yale Law Journal ranks its articles by the num-
bers.
115. 69 YALE L. 543 (1960).
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In the article I identify the multiple, often conflicting, purposes of the
criminal law and describe the interrelated points of decision from legislature,
to police, to prosecutor, to grand jury, to trial judge, to petit jury, to review
courts, to prison, to probation, to parole and pardon authorities and back. In
three case studies I develop and demonstrate the application of a model for
assessing the practices of these decisionmaking agencies, with primary focus
on police decisions not to enforce.
Unfortunately, the problems presented in the studies remain unresolved. To
take but one of them, a police department's policy not to enforce the drug laws
against certain violators who serve as informants, is to recall questions from
the past only to recognize that they are present-day issues.
I urged that legislatures be provided with a basis for evaluating their
narcotics laws and for answering such questions as:
Will full enforcement increase the price of narcotics to the user? Will
such inflation increase the frequency of crimes committed to finance
narcotics purchases? Or will full enforcement reduce the number of
users and the frequency of connected crimes? Will too great or too
costly an administrative burden be placed on the prosecutor's office and
the courts by full enforcement? Will correctional institutions be filled
beyond "effective" capacity? 116
Finally the article suggests that failures of enforcement might lead to recom-
mendations to increase treatment facilities and to legalize the sale of narcotics.
The question posed for debate was then and is now, thirty years later, whether
taking the enormous profits out of the prohibition on sales "would lessen
peddler incentive to create new addicts and eliminate the need to support the
habit by the commission of crimes."' 7
116. Id. at 573 (emphasis omitted).
117. Id.
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Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages (Parts 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37) (ranked ninth).
Commentary by William R. Perdue, Jr.,
Former Executive Vice-President,
Inmont Corporation.
The Reliance Interest presented an innovative revision of the theoretical
structure by analyzing the "interests" served by awarding contract
damages-interests that reflected underlying purposes of contract law.
Fuller posited three "interests"-restitution, reliance, and expectancy.
William R. Perdue, Jr.
Few law review articles have affected legal thinking so powerfully as The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages."'
The article appeared at a time when contract doctrine was swathed in
tension. Classically, a contract arose only from a "bargain," that is a promise
for a promise or for specified action. On breach, a plaintiff recovered the value
to him of full performance ("lost profit," expectation). No contract, no recovery.
Then came the doctrine of restitution, and ways were found to compel the
return of the value of a benefit received by a defendant from a plaintiff.
Conflict arose over a remedy for reliance-compelling compensation for
detriment done to the promissee, arising from the promissee's action (or
nonaction), done in reliance on an unbargained promise and producing no
benefit to the promisor.
Reliance produced strain. Classical rules said no relief, but it was demon-
strable that courts often granted relief for it. The Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts responded by recognizing a restricted right to recover based on reliance
(Sections 90 and 333).119
The Reliance Interest presented an innovative revision of the theoretical
structure by analyzing the "interests" served by awarding contract damag-
es-interests that reflected underlying purposes of contract law. Fuller posited
three "interests"--restitution, reliance, and expectancy. Each provided a motive
for remedy and a measure of damages, but, in a given situation, one interest
118. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12.
I was Professor Fuller's student research assistant and he graciously named me as co-author; hence,
I received the invitation to write this commentary.
He was the architect of the theoretical structure and the principal author. I did the extensive research
in American and British cases, prepared footnotes, and drafted much of the second installment which dealt
with existing case law. Fuller and I also engaged in some of the most stimulating and educational dialogues
of my life.
The Fuller-Perdue collaboration is commemorated by an endowed fund at Duke Law School providing
financial assistance for similar faculty-student partnerships.
119. RESTATE4ENT (FIRST) oF CoNTIRAcTS §§ 90, 333 (1932). For a fuller background analysis, see
Feinnan, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984).
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might provide the motive, another the measure. The article discussed, in various
aspects, the interplay of interests, explored the reliance interest in depth, and
urged that compensating reliance should have wider recognition as "a distinct
promissory interest, deserving recognition on its own account."'120
The article had no prestigious background. Fuller was then a young profes-
sor at Duke Law School, which was only beginning to achieve status as a
topflight national institution. He had written articles which attracted attention,
but not on contracts.121 Interest analysis and its terminology had no place in
existing literature. In fact, the article questioned positions of eminent expositors
of accepted doctrine. And it made a frontal attack on the inadequate treatment
of reliance in the Restatement (First) of Contracts which appeared four years
earlier with formidable sponsorship and praise.
122
Yet, in a field rich in scholarly writing, the article received wide acclaim
and exerted tremendous influence. As Professor Feinman puts it:
The simplicity and power of Fuller's interest analysis have made
it highly influential. Because of its consistency with traditional values,
its links to established doctrine, and its versatility, it is now used gener-
ally as a basic conceptual framework for contract law."
Another writer says "[its] analysis has served a generation of contracts scholars
as a model of how to think about contract law generally."'" And another
suggests it "may well have had more influence in changing American contract
jurisprudence in the past forty years than any other single article or book.'
'15
And, prefacing a somewhat critical examination, one concedes "The Reliance
Interest is our most significant article on contract law."'2
LEXIS currently lists references to the article in seventy-seven law review
articles and forty-one reported cases. Other cases, without citing the article,
apply the reliance interest. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts accepted the
structure of interests and made changes in substance and language to meet
Fuller's criticisms. 27
The article has not wholly escaped criticism of some details." But after
more than fifty years the central structure of interest analysis retains its validity
120. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 420.
121. See Winston & Paulson, Bibliography of the Published Writings ofLon L. Fuller, in L. FULLER,
THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 305 (K. Winston ed. 1981).
122. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 89-95; see also Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1981).
123. Feinman, supra note 119, at 685.
124. Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest", 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704, 733 (1982).
125. L MCNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
98 (2d ed. 1978), quoted in Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REV. 217,217 (1985).
126. Birmingham, supra note 125, at 217.
127. Farnsworth, supra note 122; Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981).
128. See, e.g., Birmingham, supra note 125, at 220.
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and the reliance interest long ago received the wider recognition urged by
Fuller. As his junior partner, I do not believe he would, in the light of subse-
quent developments, modify in any significant way the views expressed in the
article-nor would I.
Fuller went on to write extensively in jurisprudence, and his biographer
counts him as "one of America's foremost jurists." 12 9 Nonetheless, The Reli-
ance Interest may prove to be his most important and most enduring work.
129. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 433, 433 (1978).
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Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957) (ranked tenth).
Commentary by Sanford H. Kadish,
Alexander and May T. Morrison Professor of Law,
Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California, Berkeley.
The piece is redolent of John Dewey's confidence that conflicts of value
can be resolved through practical intelligence and the processes of
deliberation he termed "valuation." I no longer believe that goal to be
remotely attainable by the Supreme Court.
Sanford H. Kadish
Reflecting on a piece of work you did almost thirty-five years ago can be
a disquieting experience. It certainly has been for me. The inadequacies of the
ancient work loom out, producing a powerful desire to deny any relationship
to the author. The better features of the work, such as they may be, while
bringing some solace, carry their own pain in compelling recognition that
getting older is no assurance of getting better.
It is plain to me that I am far less sanguine than I was that there is a
rational way for the Supreme Court to elucidate the meaning of procedural due
process. The piece is redolent of John Dewey's confidence that conflicts of
value can be resolved through practical intelligence and the processes of
deliberation he termed "valuation." I no longer believe that goal to be remotely
attainable by the Supreme Court. Valuation requires the patient examination
of the facts of experience, the rigorous scrutiny of ends and means, the imagi-
native projection of alternatives and the estimation of their consequences. As
an institution, the Court is simply not equipped for that task.
Moreover, I have come to have some doubt that Dewey's methodology, no
matter how well applied, can do the job. Recent years have seen a competitive
perspective gain prominence, one which seeks instead to solve such questions
as the requirements of due process by invoking fundamental rights and which
sees Deweyian instrumentalism as a threat to these rights. Not that I am now
convinced that rights theorists have the right answers. Their arguments settle
disagreements at the price of an absolute and dogmatic posture toward certain
selected values. In that way they gain a tactical advantage in resisting compet-
ing values, but bring us no closer to whatever truth there may be in these
matters. Still, some rights theorists have mounted enough of a case to weaken
the hold of John Dewey upon me.
Of course there is another alternative-that determining the meaning of due
process (or other constitutional terms calling for broad value judgments) is a
process altogether controlled by the contingent alignments of power and will
1490 [Vol. 100: 1449
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on the Supreme Court; that we delude ourselves in thinking there are other
ways of giving meaning to constitutional texts. This I believe today no more
than I believed it 35 years ago, although I now have fewer reasons to offer than
I had then.
The Yale Law Journal
Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960) (ranked twelfth).
Commentary by Abraham S. Goldstein,
Sterling Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
Article Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1948-49.
My object was to demonstrate that even Learned Hand's generalization
lacked sufficient context and conceptual clarity to permit him to strike
the balance fairly between prosecution and defense.
Abraham S. Goldstein
Strange as it may seem from today's perspective, criminal procedure was
an underdeveloped academic field in 1960 when The State and the Accused was
written. There were very few courses on the subject and virtually no case-
books. Though much of the empirical research which arose from, and influ-
enced, legal realism had been done in the criminal justice field, the results had
not yet reached the legal literature. But in the period following World War H,
and particularly in the 1950's and 1960's, criminal procedure came of
age-both in the courts and in legal scholarship. Bridges were built between
the newly acquired facts and an older set of institutions and doctrines that had
often been based on idealized conceptions of how the law worked. Police and
prosecutorial discretion were "discovered," as was the remarkable extent to
which pretrial release was effectively denied, contested trials rarely occurred,
counsel for the defense were absent or ineffective, and rights of all sorts were
routinely waived. Pressed by field studies and by a conception of law which
looked beyond the case, legal scholars began to consider the full range of
institutions in which decisions are made about criminal law. Inquiries followed
on how the several segments of the system connect, and whether legal doctrines
were being distorted by institutional failures.
It was in that context that I wrote The State and the Accused. There had
been too few overviews of criminal procedure and most of those had been
insufficiently anchored in empirical reality or in a systemic perspective. It was
all too easy, therefore, for facile generalizations to be made which had undue
impact on the field. The often quoted statement by Judge Learned Hand, on
how our system of criminal procedure gave "every advantage" to the accused,
exemplified such generalizations. 130 My object was to demonstrate that even
130. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923):
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held
rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in
the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
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Learned Hand's generalization lacked sufficient context and conceptual clarity
to permit him to strike the balance fairly between prosecution and defense.
It is not for me to comment on how my article may have influenced general
conceptions of criminal procedure. I can, however, trace more particularly the
role it played in changing the law of pretrial discovery. The article was fre-
quently referred to by legal scholars and law reformers as they urged and won
greater pretrial discovery for defendants in criminal cases."' Its suggestion
that defendants might be required to provide reciprocal discovery in return for
access to the government's case was adopted in part in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 32 And its comparative assessment of the access each
had, over all, to the other's case may well have influenced the movement to-
wards making more of the defendant's case available to the prosecution.
13 1
The article also had some influence on discussions of pretrial screening pro-
cesses, such as the preliminary hearing and the grand jury, and their relation
to prosecutorial discretion and the guilty plea. And the article laid a foundation
for my later work on systems of criminal prosecution here and abroad, and on
how "inquisitorial" procedures and a role for victims might have to compensate
for the limits of adversary processes.
Would I write the article differently today? The details would, of course,
not be the same but the approach would be. In a system still pervaded by bitter
conflicts between those who weigh differently the importance of due process
and crime control, there is a continuing need to determine what prosecution or
defense may gain or lose, over all, if adjustments are made in legal doctrine
at any point in the process or in institutions which administer those doctrines.
If I were to try today to strike the appropriate balance between state and
accused, I would probably trace again along the lines I set out in 1960.
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see... Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused ....
What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays,
and defeats the prosecution of crime.
131. See Mosteller Discovery Against the Defense: Ti7ing the Adversarial Balance, 74 CALiF. L. REv.
1567, 1571 n.9 (1986).
132. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
133. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
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Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (ranked thirteenth).
Commentary by Robert H. Mnookin,
Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law
and Director, Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation,
Stanford University.
The article's core idea is deceptively simple, and is encapsulated by the
"shadow" metaphor: expectations about what might happen in court
affect negotiated resolutions outside of court.
Robert H. Mnookin
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce explores the
effects of the formal legal system on dispute settlement outside of court-where
most of the action takes place. The article's core idea is deceptively simple,
and is encapsulated by the "shadow" metaphor: expectations about what might
happen in court affect resolutions negotiated outside of court. The law's shadow
is cast by legal rules and procedures, as well as by other institutional features
of the formal legal system. The article suggests, however, that the connection
between what courts do and how parties might negotiate is neither simple nor
certain. Bargaining is also affected by the characteristics of the particular
disputants themselves, including their preferences about outcomes, attitudes
towards risks, and capacities to bear the transaction costs of litigation. To make
matters yet more complicated, the possibility of strategic interaction-i.e., the
idea that each party's bargaining behavior affects the response of the other, and
vice versa-suggests that no existing theoretical model can predict with certain-
ty the outcome in a particular dispute or how different legal rules or procedures
will necessarily affect negotiated outcomes.
The article's conceptual model, as the title suggests, is used to examine in
some detail how the shadow of the law affects bargaining in the specific
context of divorce. To a substantial degree, family law scholarship and policy
debates had previously focused primarily on judicial regulation of the lives of
divorcing families, the effect of legal rules and procedures on judicial behavior,
and the resolution of conflict inside the courtroom. The article makes the
normative claim that the primary purpose of the legal system at the time of
divorce should be to provide a framework for private ordering. It then demon-
strates that various family law doctrinal distinctions and policy proposals look
very different from the bargaining perspective of spouses negotiating a settle-
ment. For example, child support, alimony, and marital property all concern
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money and may very well be linked in negotiations to custody issues. It pleases
me that in the decade since the article was published, policy debates about
family law reforms have commonly included an analysis of the possible impact
of proposed changes on the relative bargaining endowments of men and women,
and that the legitimacy of private ordering at the time of divorce is now widely
accepted. I remain of the view that within suitable limits, a regime premised
on the idea of private ordering is legitimate and appropriate."M
I continue to be fascinated by bargaining in the law's shadow. With an
interdisciplinary group at Stanford, I am presently studying the barri-
ers-strategic, institutional, and cognitive-to the negotiated resolution of
conflict. Why do some negotiations fail, even though the parties would all
benefit from a resolution? Divorce bargaining in particular remains near the
center of my research concerns. The Stanford Child Custody Study is a large-
scale empirical study of divorce custody that, among other things, confirms to
a remarkable degree the extent to which negotiation, not adjudication, char-
acterizes dispute resolution at the time of divorce. Of the 908 families in our
study who had completed their divorce by 1988, it appears that a judge was
required to adjudicate a custody issue in only thirteen. 135 This striking finding
poses many interesting questions. Can a match stick on top of a pyramid cast
a shadow large enough to influence the expectations of hundreds standing in
the sand? To what extent do parties bargain outside the law's shadow, influ-
enced largely by non-legal norms?136 To what extent do various institutional
elements of the legal system-such as the organization of the bar, the availabili-
ty of mediation or other alternatives, and the substantive rules them-
selves-affect the shape of the dispute pyramid? In a variety of contexts, further
theoretical and empirical research concerning how people bargain in the shadow
of the law remains indispensable if we are to understand better how the legal
system affects behavior and to appraise better the consequences of legal reform.
134. See Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015
(1985).
135. Mnookdn, Maccoby Albiston & Depner, Private Ordering Revisited: What CustodialArrangements
Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990).
136. See Elliekson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
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II
Commentary by Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law.
Analyses of judicial opinions commonly assume that the behavior
required by a legal rule is normatively desirable. Bargaining denies this
assumption. It states clearly that society may best meet its goals indi-
rectly, by requiring some behavior other than the behavior it desires
most. Bargaining also suggests that society may not always be able to
get what it most desires.
Lewis A. Kornhauser
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce (hereinafter
Bargaining) makes two simple claims. First, the behavior specified (or required)
by a legal rule may differ from the behavior induced by that legal rule. This
point underlies the economic analysis of law, though, at the time Bargaining
was published, economic analysis of law primarily focused on the effects of
the legal rule on "pre-dispute" behavior. Second, and following from the first,
one should evaluate legal rules in terms of the actual behavior induced rather
than in terms of the behavior the rule demands.
Throughout the writing of the article and for some time afterward, I regard-
ed these two points as uncontroversial. Recently, I have more fully understood
the radical implications they have for the understanding of adjudication. Analy-
ses of judicial opinions commonly assume that the behavior required by a legal
rule is normatively desirable. Bargaining denies this assumption. It states
clearly that society may best meet its goals indirectly, by requiring some
behavior other than the behavior it desires most. Bargaining also suggests that
society may not always be able to get what it most desires.
The discussion in Bargaining of the "best-interest-of-the-child" and joint
custody standards suggests both these points. Actual settlements under each
standard differ from the announced norm. Implementation of the best-interest
standard may require mandating some other rule. The joint custody standard
illustrates a second difficulty: it imposes an outcome that is desirable if consen-
sual but undesirable if coerced. It may thus be difficult for a court to announce
a legal rule that both requires and induces socially desirable conduct.
The debate between the alternative dispute resolution movement and those
"against settlement" revolves around this elision of required-to-desired behavior.
Those who oppose settlement contend that litigation, unlike settlement, an-
nounces public values. The expression of public value, however, might occur
in two different ways. The value might be embodied in the actual rule; the
required behavior is the publicly valued behavior. Or the expression of public
values in a judicial opinion may occur through the reasoning and rhetoric that
1496 [Vol. 100: 1449
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justify and support the announced legal rule. The logic of Bargaining favors
this latter understanding of adjudication, while those against settlement appar-
ently endorse the former, and urge that judges have the obligation to announce
only legal rules that embody the values and aims the society seeks to promote.
I hope to address elsewhere and at greater length the implications of this
central assumption of Bargaining-the tension between the embodiment (in
rules) and the realization of social values.
The Yale Law Journal
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (ranked fourteenth).
Commentary by John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia University Law School.
Among academics, the "race to the bottom" thesis received a more
skeptical reception, with "law and economics" scholars pointing to it
as an object lesson in how to misunderstand the impact of competitive
markets. Yet, I would predict that a revival of interest in the Cary thesis
is likely, because his critics are increasingly vulnerable.
John C. Coffee, Jr.
The publication of Bill Cary's Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware had the impact of a firecracker in a hornets' nest. Its claim that
Delaware had led a race to the bottom that left shareholders without adequate
protection (i) embarrassed and infuriated the Delaware bench and bar, (ii) may
have been responsible for a surprising string of pro-shareholder decisions in
Delaware over the next decade,'37 (iii) provoked the then adolescent "law and
economics" movement to respond that the race was to the top, not the bot-
tom,'38 (iv) motivated Ralph Nader and his cohorts to recommend federal
chartering of corporations,'39 and (v) generally gave law students a simple
phrase by which to understand a complex phenomenon.
Among academics, the "race to the bottom" thesis received a more skeptical
reception, with "law and economics" scholars pointing to it as an object lesson
in how to misunderstand the impact of competitive markets. Yet, I would
predict that a revival of interest in the Cary thesis is likely, because his critics
are increasingly vulnerable. Although Professor (now Judge) Winter answered
that corporations that adopted sub-optimal rules would be compelled to pay
more for their equity capital and so would be at a competitive disadvantage in
their product markets,"4 the force of this argument depends on the degree
137. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (establishing "reason-
ableness" standard for review of takeover defensive tactics); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985) (imposing liability on corporate directors for breach of the duty of care); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (adopting intermediate standard thatpermits some judicial review ofjustifications
advanced by a special litigation committee for dismissal of a derivative suit); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (requiring "business purpose" and new standard of valuation in parentsubsidiary
squeeze out mergers).
138. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977). This article was later expanded into a book. R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE
CORPORATION 28-42 (1978).
139. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & I SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
140. R. WINTER, supra note 138, at 10-11 ("[A] corporation's ability to competi effectively in product
markets is related to its ability to raise capital, and management's tenure in office is related to the price
of [its] stock").
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to which public corporations rely on the equity markets as a source of capital.
Much evidence suggests that they place little reliance on this market.1 41 Also,
with takeover premiums averaging around fifty percent, it is highly questionable
whether a small discount in stock price attributable to the use of a sub-optimal
jurisdiction of incorporation will trigger capital market discipline. Similarly,
while Professor Roberta Romano has accurately observed that Delaware's
unique dependence on charter revenues as a source of tax income amounts to
a form of bonding mechanism,1 42 this implies only that Delaware is likely
to continue to serve the interests of those whom it believes determine the
incorporation decision. Thus, this conclusion leaves the ultimate issue unre-
solved: who are the "consumers" of corporate law-that is, shareholders or
managers-whose collective preferences represent the demand curve in the
market for corporate charters?
The most important statutory development in corporate law over the last
decade may shed some light on this question. A majority of state jurisdictions
have enacted stringent anti-takeover statutes since 1982.143 Few, if any, be-
lieve that these statutes have maximized shareholder welfare, although they
have certainly protected managerial interests. In the case of other states, one
can explain this development as the product of in-state interest groups (particu-
larly local labor and management) whose desire for protection outweighs the
interest of the state's taxpayers in maximizing franchise tax revenues. Yet this
explanation does not apply to Delaware, which essentially lacks these constitu-
encies because it has few local industries. Thus, Delaware's adoption of a
relatively "weak" anti-takeover statute tI" and its subsequent pro-management
decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.45 seem to corrobo-
rate the Cary thesis because they cannot be explained as aiding in-state interest
groups. Indeed, the curtailment of takeovers they caused reduced litigation and
thus worked against the interests of the Delaware bar. From a public choice
141. See M. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY,
PRACtICE AND POLICY 337, 345-49 (1987) (internal cash flow has funded an average 90 percent of real
investment of largest U.S. industrial corporations, in part because of legal disincentives to public offerings).
142. See Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, J.L. ECON. & ORG.
225 (1985). Supplementing Professor Romano's thesis, Professors Macey and Miller have focused on the
"supply side" of the market for charters and argued that states may adopt or tolerate sub-optimal rules
because they advance the interests ofpowerful interest groups within the state (most typically, the local bar).
See Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469
(1987).
143. One recent survey shows 42 states have adopted some form of "major anti-takeover legislation."
See 42 States Currently Have Anti-takeover Laws, ABA Group Told, 22 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No.
33, at 1216 (Aug. 17, 1990).
144. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988) falls into the category of a "moratorium" statute; it
restricts mergers or other business combinations for three years, unless certain conditions are satisfied.
However, because the Delaware law is not applicable if 85 percent of the shares are tendered or if a
subsequent shareholder vote waives the statute's restrictions, it is considered far milder than other "moratori-
um" statutes.
145. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (approving defensive takeover tactics under deferential standard of
judicial review).
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perspective, only a concern about loss of tax revenues because of outward
corporate migration can logically explain these events. If so, the demand side
of the equation would sometimes appear to be driven by managerial, not
shareholder, preferences, and the race does not necessarily lead to the top. The
takeover movement may have stalled, but in so doing it suggests that Bill
Cary's thesis should survive to be debated for decades to come.
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Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) (tied for fifteenth).
Commentary by Guido Calabresi,
Dean and Sterling Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
Note Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1957-58.
[T]he failure to have all the relevant tests described in one place, at the
time when product liability law was exploding, has probably meant that
judicial language in the area will never achieve the kind of lucidity one
might have wished for and expected.
Guido Calabresi
When Jon Hirschoff and I set out to write Toward A Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, we had, I think, several objectives in mind. The first was to point out
the fundamental difference between cost-benefit based tests for liability (such
as the Learned Hand Fault test) and tests (such as the one we called the Strict
Liability test) in which the decisionmaker eschewed cost-benefit judgments.
Second, we wished to point out that the recent move to strict liability in torts
could not be explained predominantly on wealth distribution or spreading
grounds, as was commonly stated, but was likely to stem from dissatisfaction
with the meager accomplishments of fault type tests in reducing the sum of
accident and safety costs.
Third, we wanted to emphasize the importance of practical over theoretical
issues in determining which approach to tort liability ought to predominate. In
particular, we wanted to explore the effect that (a) the level of generality at
which a liability rule worked best, (b) the existence of insurance, and (c) the
presence of third party victims, would have on whether fault or strict liability
tests were likely to be most effective in achieving optimal degrees of safety.
Fourth, we hoped to give courts some guidance in product liability cases by
helping them see how strict product liability fit with older examples of non-
fault liability (such as extra hazardous activity liability and assumption of risk),
and how they might approach the question of whom to hold strictly liable.
Finally, we wished to indicate the relationships and tensions between those
goals which focused on yielding an optimal degree of safety and other goals,
like those concerned with distribution of wealth.
While I believe the article succeeded very well in much that it set out to
do, several changes would have made it stronger. First, the article took for
granted that readers and courts would understand that strict liability, as we used
it, did not mean injurer liability, but meant a way of determining when injurers
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and when victims should bear losses regardless of fault. Most of the criticisms
of the piece, including Richard Posner's,1 6 center on this simple (and, if I
may say so, simplistic) misreading of the article. I still believe that our meaning
should have been obvious. How else could one explain the extended discussion
of assumption of risk (which placed losses on faultless victims) as a paradigm,
albeit an often misapplied one, of a strict liability rule? How else could one
deal with the then predominant legislative effort toward what was universally
termed strict liability: first party automobile liability laws, which assigned
losses primarily to the injured party?
Nevertheless, many critics failed to see the point, and therefore necessarily
failed to see the more subtle, and crucially important point, that strict liability
tests, no less than fault tests, could, and often should, divide losses among
injurers and victims in order to optimize safety. This point was explicitly made
in various places (e.g., p. 1068, where the limited liability of a steel mill for
the hand of a worker who is also a great violinist is discussed). But, like the
fact that strict liability could mean victim liability, it should have been empha-
sized more.
Second, the article missed the fact that courts, especially in product liability
cases, were sometimes using a non-fault test which was based on a cost-benefit
analysis and hence differed both from the true fault tests (Learned Hand and
reverse Learned Hand) and what we termed strict liability tests. The definition
of this ex-post, or non-fault Learned Hand test, and its significance, especially
in product liability and nuisance cases, had to wait years for fuller examination
in an article by Calabresi and Klevorick. 147 This delay inevitably made the
Calabresi-Hirschoff article less useful to courts than it might have been. Indeed,
the failure to have all the relevant tests described in one place, at the time when
product liability law was exploding, has probably meant that judicial language
in the area will never achieve the kind of lucidity one might have wished for
and expected.
Finally, while a short piece like the Calabresi-Hirschoff article could not
have done much more than it did, I nevertheless today find the discussion of
146. See, e.g., Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 L LEGAL STUD. 205, 205 n.1, 208, 213-15 (1973);
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 L LEGAL STuD. 323,327-28, 338 (1973); England, The
System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 49 (1980);
see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 160-67 (3d ed. 1986); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility
in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539 (1972). Scholars are apt to misread the article on this point,
even when they do not criticize it. Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (1980).
See, e.g., Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations
of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1170 n.77 (1981); Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on
Insurance: The AvailabilitylAffordability Crisis and its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U.L REV. 285, 287 &
n.5 (1988); Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS
LJ. 529, 550 n.118 (1983); Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability, 21
GA. L. REV. 843, 862 n.66 (1987); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L REV. 851, 865 nn.62 & 63 (1984); Winter, Economic
Regulation v. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 YALE LJ. 890, 899-900 n.25 (1973).
147. Calabresi & Kievorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 . LEGAL STUD. 585 (1985).
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the relationship of the strict liability and fault-based tests to goals other than
safety optimization to be inadequate. The lumping of all other goals together
under the rubric of distribution is not helpful. It combines issues as different
as taste or value shaping with notions of just desert and decisions based on
wealth and class or caste differences. That is not only not useful but inevitably
tends to understate the significance of the goals that are lumped together.
The principal point, that courts and juries have a role to play as to these,
was correct then, and is still. But had we not been so concerned with rebutting
Fletcher's recent article, 11 I think we could have said it, and more, more
profoundly.
II
Commentary by Jon T. Hirschoff,
Partner,
Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn,
New Haven, Connecticut.
If negligence and strict liability could be subsumed in a new doctrinal
structure in which information about risks and ability to act with
respect to risks are central, it would be worth asking whether we can
afford the administrative complexity, jury confusion, and other costs of
having accident cases pleaded and tried simultaneously in negligence
and strict liability.
Jon T. Hirschoff
Guido Calabresi's comment looks back on the objectives we had in mind
when we set out to write Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts. I would
like to consider instead some implications of our article which I am not sure
we had in mind.
We suggested that in formulating a test for strict liability for product
defects, courts should look to factors such as knowledge of the risk (and thus
adequacy of warning) and appropriateness of use to determine who was in the
best position, with respect to the accident risk, to make a cost-benefit analysis
and act upon it. Such factors, we pointed out, are commonly mentioned in
assumption of risk cases and in traditional strict liability cases. In many of these
cases, liability turns not on whether thedefendant and plaintiff ought to have
acted as they did, but rather on who was in a better position to perceive the
risk, make the cost-benefit analysis, and act upon it.
A question worth examining, I think, is whether a test like ours could serve
as a more general test for liability for accident risks, facilitating the eventual
148. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
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abandonment of the distinction between fault-based liability and strict liability.
We did not mention the many cases in which liability for conduct which ought
not have occurred is said to be limited, by language sounding in duty or
proximate cause, because the harm which occurred was not a risk with respect
to which the defendant's conduct was negligent. 149 In many of those cases,
it could be said that the defendant was in no better position than the plaintiff
to perceive the risk which is the subject of the litigation, make the cost-benefit
analysis, and act upon it.
It would be worthwhile to examine the extent to which cases like Palsgraf
imply that the purpose of the negligence inquiry is not the establishment, by
judges and juries, of standards of behavior, but is the determination of whether
the defendant's negligence has frustrated the plaintiff's legitimate expectations
about accident risks. Similarly, it is worth asking whether the reason for the
absence of liability for non-negligent activity which carries with it the statistical
risk of accidents is that the utility of the activity justifies the taking of lives and
limbs, or is instead that such activity is part of the background of accident risks
which individuals generally expect to bear.
If negligence and strict liability could be subsumed in a new doctrinal
structure in which information about risks and ability to act with respect to risks
are central, it would be worth asking whether we can afford the administrative
complexity, jury confusion, and other costs of having accident cases pleaded
and tried simultaneously in negligence and strict liability.
149. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Stan-
dards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973) (tied for fif-
teenth).
Commentary by Harry H. Wellington,
Sterling Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
[It must be that the process of adjudication profoundly influences the
way courts interpret legal materials. My 1973 article--and much con-
temporary writing-seems innocent of this obvious truth.
Harry H. Wellington
First, this 1973 article is not sufficiently attentive to the process of adjudica-
tion. It sees the judge as a legal scholar working alone in a quiet corner of the
library. The trouble with this picture is that judges deal with disputes framed
by lawyers arguing to win for their clients and-as Bob Cover has taught
us-often urging the court to commit violence. Moreover, at the appellate level,
more than one judge is involved in the case. This means that negotiation is part
of the process of adjudication; and it means that in the field of law, interpre-
tation is different from interpretation in other humanistic disciplines. For it must
be that the process of adjudication profoundly influences the way courts
interpret legal materials. My 1973 article-and much contemporary writ-
ing-seems innocent of this obvious truth.
Second, my discussion of conventional morality may be misleading. It is
wrong to think about finding conventional morality. It is not like digging for
gold and discovering the ore. Among the participants in adjudication-the
lawyers and judges-there must be a constructive reexamination of the attitudes
that I contend reveal our public values and comprise our conventional morality.
The Yale University Press has recently published my book, Interpreting the
Constitution.15 In that book, I revisit some of the problems addressed in the
article and take account of what I seemed innocent of in 1973.
150. H. WELLINGrON, INTERPRETlNG THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS
OF ADJUDICATION (1990).
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Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) (older
article, ranked twenty-second).
Commentary by Myres S. McDougal,
Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus,
Yale Law School.
[A] jurisprudence which stops short at national boundaries, as most of
our inherited frames of jurisprudence do, is hopelessly inadequate in
the contemporary interdependent world. It remains our conviction that
a theory for inquiry about law which would serve the needs of a free
society, whatever the community, must contain components at least
comparable to those recommended in our initial article.
Myres S. McDougal
In our first collaborative publication, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, Harold Lasswell and I sought to
add a more constructive dimension to the emerging jurisprudence of American
Legal Realism. Like the Realists, we emphasized that the most viable concep-
tion of law is that of the process of authoritative decision by which the mem-
bers of a community clarify and secure their common interests, but we made
call also for a comprehensive, systematic, and deliberate focus, in legal scholar-
ship and education, upon the making and application of community policy.
We observed that the most rational method for integrating claims of particu-
lar interests into a common interest requires a careful, contextual examination
of all particular claims in relation to the community values at stake, and the
creative estimation of the decision that-under the conditions of an evolving
future-might best approximate common interest. The appropriate contextual
examination and estimation required, we suggested, three major components:
a framework of theory for the formulation and location of problems in their
larger community context; the explicit articulation and postulation, for general
guidance in the decisions, of a community's most fundamental, constitutive
policies; and the employment of a comprehensive set of distinctive, though
interrelated, intellectual tasks in the making of, and inquiry about, particular
decisions.
The necessary framework of theory demanded an empirical, designative
reference to all features of community process, at all levels of community, and
included processes of both effective and authoritative power, as well as of other
cherished values. The fundamental community policies recommended for
postulation were those commonly characterized as the values of human dignity,
now made authoritative for the global community by the human rights conven-
tions and other decisions. The intellectual tasks described as relevant included
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the detailed clarification of policies in relation to particular problems, the
examination of past trends in decision (and their value consequences) upon
comparable problems, the exploration of the predispositional and environmental
conditions affecting past decisions, the projection of probable future conditions,
and, finally, the calculation of the decision that under the circumstances would
appear most likely to express the common interest.
In a seminar on "Law, Science, and Policy," designed largely for prospec-
tive teachers and offered for several decades in the Yale Law School, Lasswell
and I sought to build upon and develop the themes announced in the article.
In collaboration with our students and other associates, we made application
of the recommended theories and procedures in many books and articles, most
notably in international law, property law, and criminal law.51 A book to be
published in 1991- Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society:
Studies in Law, Science, and Policy-will contain the lectures and other
materials, somewhat revised and updated, prepared by Lasswell and me to con-
duct the seminar.
At the present time, Professor Michael Reisman in the Yale Law School
and associates elsewhere offer strong leadership in the application-and im-
provement-of the recommended theories and procedures in relation to global
and other transnational processes of authoritative decision. The importance of
a beginning emphasis upon transnational processes of decision derives from
recognition that a jurisprudence which stops short at national boundaries, as
most of our inherited frames of jurisprudence do, is hopelessly inadequate in
the contemporary interdependent world. It remains our conviction that a theory
for inquiry about law which would serve the needs of a free society, whatever
the community, must contain components at least comparable to those recom-
mended in our initial article.
151. The range of publication is indicated inR. MUTH, M. FINLEY & M. MUTH, HAROLD D. LASSWELL:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1990); R. SHIMANE & R. RICH, WORKS OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL (Asa
V. Call Law Library Bibliography Series No. 97, University of Southern California Law Center, 1980);
Tipson, Bibliography of Works By and In Relation to Myres S. McDougal, in appendix to W. REISMAN &
B. WESTON, TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNrrY (1976).
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Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704 (1931) (older article, ranked twenty-eighth).
Commentary by Paul Gewirtz,
Professor of Law,
Yale Law School.
Note and Project Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1969-70.
What moved me then, and still moves me, is that its intellectual ambi-
tiousness and personal voice pointed to a possibility I cherished-the
possibility that the study and profession of law could engage our deep-
est human yearnings.
Paul Gewirtz
Sixty years after publication, Llewellyn's article still amazes with the
richness of its ideas, the scale of its ambition, and the craggy grandeur of its
execution.
What Price Contract?152 is an interpretive essay about the relationship
between contract law and society, investigating contract's features as a social
institution rather than dissecting legal doctrine. With Llewellyn widely regarded
today as the most important "legal realist," this article's protean quality contin-
ues to make it influential.
153
Several themes stand out, and they retain much of their radical edge:
(1) Social Practices. First, and most importantly, Llewellyn exhorts us to
"awake to people and their doings," to the life of commercial customs and
other social practices that exist "apart from law."'" Llewellyn's goal is partly
descriptive: pointing to the diversity of bargaining relations that other scholars
ignore, describing how contracting practices have adjusted to an evolving
economic system. But his normative claim is central: the truest bases for sound
judicial decisions are "understandings in the world of dealings"' 55 and "pres-
sure from the facts."' 56
(2) System, Rule and Form. Insisting on the primacy of social practices has
other consequences. Unlike other legal realists, Llewellyn was not contemptuous
152. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704 (1931). The first
part of the title apparently alludes to a well known anti-war play of the 1920's, What Price Glory?, by
Maxwell Anderson and Laurence Stallings.
153. For example, both critical legal studies scholars, see, e.g., Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the
Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 568; Kennedy, Legal
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 351, 380 n.49, 384 n.54 (1973), and law and economics scholars of various
stripes, see, e.g., Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1025
n. 177 (1990); W'lliamson, Intellectual Foundations: The Need for a Broader View, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
210, 216 (1983), have recently spoken of the article's continuing importance.
154. Llewellyn, supra note 152, at 705, 713.
155. Id. at 714.
156. Id. at 749.
1508 [Vol. 100: 1449
Most-Cited Articles
of legal rules, formality, or the scholar's impulse to systematize. But he thought
all systems, rules, and forms tend to become rigid, to insulate us from the rich
particularity in fact situations and the ongoing changes in social
practices-indispensable ingredients for rightly resolving cases. He thus under-
scores a perpetual tension: inescapably, life in its urgent particularity strains
against and modifies ever-ossifying generalizations and forms.
(3) Law's Place. Emphasizing social practices also brings Llewellyn to
insist that contract law plays a more marginal role than commonly assumed.
In most commercial relations (for example, long-term contractual relationships),
nonlegal sanctions shape behavior more than legal sanctions do. Parties continu-
ally make informal adjustments with little attention to the contract terms, and
typically resolve disputes without resort to law. Law reporters, therefore,
contain the rare "hospital case," not the typical commercial transaction. Thus,
Llewellyn sees contract law as a backdrop to the world of bargaining and
dealing, providing rarely-invoked sanctions and, perhaps more importantly,
quietly strengthening an "ideology of duty" that encourages adherence to
promises.
(4) Power. Finally, Llewellyn's attention to social context leads him to
identify unequal bargaining power as a recurring problem (intensified by the
emergence of standardized contracts) that requires a judicial remedy. Here,
however, a central uncertainty surfaces about Llewellyn's focus on social
practices-an uncertainty that pervades his writings.157 Llewellyn suggests
at times that a sound contract law should enshrine commercial norms. But in
the face of unequal bargaining power, Llewellyn recognizes that commercial
norms may be unfair and that other values are relevant in shaping the law. He
leaves us uncertain, then, about what is the source of values in law.
We miss something fundamental, though, if we talk about this article only
as its ideas. Equally remarkable is-I can think of no better phrase-the heroic
sensibility pervading it.
From enigmatic title to florid close, What Price Contract? is fired by
imaginative desire. Throughout, one experiences the presence of a passionate,
ambitious explorer, an utterly original mind excitedly seeking the new, taking
intellectual gambles, striving for the deepest understanding from the widest
perspective, discovering "meaning.... opalescence,.., vibrancy,... fragile
beauty,"15 "return[ing] with fresh eyes and fresh zest to the study of the
heaped up cases .... ",159
We might see this passion-with the sprawling footnotes, the patches of
fevered prose, the exuberant, sudden leaps from subject to subject and continent
to continent, the abrupt proclamation halfway through that "too late for remedy"
157. See, e.g., Gewirtz, Editor's Introduction to K. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA
at xx-xxi (P. Gewirtz, ed., M. Ansaldi, trans.) (1989).
158. Llewellyn, supra note 152, at 707.
159. Id. at 705.
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he finds that "this whole paper is thrown off center"'--as simply self-indul-
gence. But to do so ignores the link in What Price Contract? between grand
manner and dramatic substantive achievement. More to the point, it ignores that
an aspect of this article's originality is Llewellyn's unique sensibility-reflected
in rhetoric, approach, and form, even (or rather especially) when these seem
most curious.
The notion that what is most original in a legal mind may be one's sensibil-
ity, not simply summarizable ideas, strikes many in the legal academy as very
odd. That notion means, after all, that often the most interesting thing is to
observe a mind moving along a thought, not so much the thought itself. For
some, this smacks too much of the literary. But it is the sensibility and spirit
pervading What Price Contract? that I think explains much of the power it has
always wielded over readers, why so many discuss it with an attitude of awe.
(One shudders to imagine how the student editors of today's law reviews would
try to "edit" the article-restraining the leaps, toning down the intensity,
smoothing out the jagged shapes, trying to conform the exceptional to the
ordinary.)
I remember precisely my first encounter with What Price Contract? I was
a first-term law student, and I am sure much of the article's substance eluded
me. But the article struck me as no other legal writing did in those formative
days. What moved me then, and still moves me, is that its intellectual ambi-
tiousness and personal voice pointed to a possibility I cherished-the possibility
that the study and profession of law could engage our deepest human yearnings.
The article's closing-for all its melodrama-remains unforgettable:
One turns from contemplation of the work of contract as from the
experience of Greek tragedy. Life struggling against form, or through
form to its will-"pity and terror-." Law means so pitifully little to
life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on the law.
160. Id. at 733 n.63.
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Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (not ranked because of earliness).
Commentary by Frank I. Michelman,
Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School.
To Hohfeld's effort,... we stand directly indebted for insight derived
from the claim that in a modern, positive legal order the normatively
significant entities are dyadic relations exhaustively reducible to two
master types: right/duty and power/liability (convertible by negation into
no-rightlprivilege and disabilitylimmunity).
Frank I. Michelman
Hohfeld's article 161 is remembered today as a major contribution to mod-
em legal science. The article did not pioneer the work of conceptual schemati-
zation called analytical jurisprudence. 62 Rather, it gave the scheme its lasting,
canonical form. It also prompted a surge of interest in the scheme's utility for
precise description, comparison, and evaluation of cases under legal disputation.
To Hohfeld's effort, as sympathetically elucidated by Arthur Corbin161 and
Walter W. Cook,"6 we stand directly indebted for insight derived from the
claim that in a modem, positive legal order the normatively significant entities
are dyadic relations exhaustively reducible to two master types: right/duty and
power/liability (convertible by negation into no-right/privilege and disabili-
ty/immunity).
Hohfeld stipulated these names for the four resulting entitlements and their
four correlative disentitlements. He neatly defined each entitlement and
disentitlement in terms of its simple, logical relations to all the others. He
thereby furnished a device for precise discrimination among legal issues that
ought to be held distinct for purposes of ethical evaluation, but were prone to
confusion in ordinary legal rhetoric. An important example, elaborately worked
up by Cook,'6 is the ease of leaping-erroneously-from (i) an employer's
acknowledged privilege of soliciting temporally binding service contracts from
uncontracted workers and (ii) an employer's acknowledged right (and worker's
correlative duty) of performance of a contract once made, to (iii) a duty
161. Hohfeld, supra note 22; see also Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J 710 (1917).
162. For an account of the earlier development of analytical jurisprudence, see generally Singer, The
Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975.
163. See Corbin, Jural Relations and their Classification, 30 YALE L.L 226 (1921).
164. See generally Cook, Introduction to W. HOHFELD, SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (W. Cook ed. 1934); Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle
for Life, 27 YALE L.. 779 (1918) [hereinafter Privileges of Labor Unions].
165. Privileges of Labor Unions, supra note 164, at 787-88.
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assertedly owed by third parties to employers to refrain from enticing contract-
ed workers into violation and (iv) a third party's (asserted) duty to employers
to refrain from competition for the services or loyalties of workers not yet
under contract. Cook made effective use of Hohfeld's discriminating vocabu-
lary166 to demonstrate that issues (iii) and (iv) are analytically distinct from
issues (i) and (ii), so that resolutions of (iii) and (iv) cannot be deduced from
resolutions of (i) and (ii) without fresh exercises of ethical judgment."6
Cook was engaged in denouncing the Supreme Court's generous construal
of the entitlements secured to employers by "yellow dog" contracts at common
law.168 There was much in the Hohfeldian analysis that proved to be of great
argumentative service to legal Progressives and social democrats. The analysis
made clear that there is no such thing as one person's positive legal entitlement
unaccompanied by another's corresponding disentitlement1 69 It further strong-
ly implied that duty-free zones of conduct (Hohfeldian "privileges") are no
more (or less) "natural," no more (or less) politically chosen-hence no more
(or less) demanding of ethical justification-than legally actionable
"rights."'17 These points became strongly thematic in Progressive legal clas-
sics by Morris Cohen,171 Robert Hale,172 and Karl Llewellyn, 73 and have
remained so in our own day's works of social-democratic inclination. 74
Yet Hohfeldian analytical jurisprudence also functions conservatively, in
defense of exclusive, anti-redistributive property rights. The tendency of its
individualist methodology is to reduce every question of policy or value to one
of private-party contention. 75 If the analysis teaches that every legal entitle-
ment in A entails the exposure of some B to A's state-sanctioned power, it
correlatively teaches that every legal measure undertaken for the sake of B's
emancipation is an intrusion on the property of some A. 176 The Hohfeldian
relation between A and B is relentlessly zero-sum. There can be no Hohfeldian
cooperative commonwealth.
166. See id. at 787-92.
167. See id. at 790.
168. His specific target was the opinion of Justice Pitney in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U.S. 219 (1917).
169. See also Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711,
759-60 (1980).
170. This was a point much emphasized by Corbin. See Corbin, supra note 163, at 237-38; Kennedy
& Michelman, supra note 169, at 761-62, 769-70.
171. E.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
172. E.g., Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCi. Q. 470
(1923).
173. E.g., Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
174. See, e.g., Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Singer, supra note 162.
175. Cf. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 13, 36, 318-19 (1985) (asserting, and attributing to Locke,
principle that government's rights and privileges vis-a-vis individuals are no greater than those of individuals
inter sese).
176. See id. at 36. See generally Hartog, The Constitution as Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong
to Us All," 74 J. Am. HIST. 1013, 1020-25 (1987).
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William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) (not ranked because of earliness).
Commentary by Louis Loss,
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Emeritus,
Harvard Law School.
Note Editor, The Yale Law Journal, 1936-37.
The article reflects ... a "conservative" (if not establishmentarian)
"Wall Street lawyer" who, while accepting arguendo the need for
certain reform, properly worries about the unsettling effect on the law
and his clients.
Louis Loss
The Douglas-Bates article was written in late 1933, when the infant statute
was still administered by the Federal Trade Commission and before the passage
of the 1934 Act, which created the SEC and softened somewhat the 1933 civil
liability provisions. As a senior in college at the time, I was blissfully unaware
of Congress' gift to the investing public (not to mention the Bar). I would have
been surprised to be told that two years later I would be sitting at Professor
Douglas' feet in New Haven, and that two years after that I would be a fresh-
man in the office of the SEC's General Counsel.
Having now spent a half-century and more exploring the manifold mysteries
of the body of securities law that began with the little 18-page statute of 1933,
I picked up 43 Yale Law Journal wondering what I would find on a rereading
of the famous article after so many years. It was not quite what I had expected.
To take a few of the article's central themes:
Theme one, vagueness: "the Act promises to defeat in part its purpose by
virtue of its uncertainties," which will require a "decade" of judicial interpre-
tation.1"7 The reality: After almost six decades the Supreme Court has just
decided its tenth case on the definition of the keystone term, "security.'
78
Theme two, the Cassandra quality: The cumulative effects of the strict civil
liabilities make it apparent that "the Act will prevent a great amount of financ-
ing by many companies with well established businesses and will continue to
deter refunding operations and reorganizations."' 79 The reality: The 30,000
registration statements filed during the first thirty-five years of the SEC's
177. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.L 171, 173 (1933).
178. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
179. Douglas & Bates, supra note 177, at 192. The reference here is to § 11, under which an issuer
is subject to strict liability with respect to the registration statement and every director, officer, expert, or
underwriter, as well as (under § 15) every person who "controls" any such defendant, is individually liable
subject to various defenses as to which the defendant has the burden of proof.
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history resulted in two adjudicated recoveries together with six reported deci-
sions approving settlements of class actions.18
Theme three, administrative excess: "It is idle to speculate on the extreme
limits to which a tolerant judiciary might" sustain the power to define some-
thing as broad as "trade terms." '181 The reality: What would Douglas have said
to a Rule 506 that takes several columns of the SEC Docket, complete with
filing requirements, to "define" the phrase, "transactions not involving any
public offering"?
This is hardly the "liberal" (if not radical) Douglas who in 1971 upheld a
private right of action under Rule lOb-5-with the resulting federalization of
a vast body of corporate law-by a footnote stating: "It is now established that
a private right of action is implied under 10(b)."182 The article reflects, rather,
a "conservative" (if not establishmentarian) "Wall Street lawyer" who, while
accepting arguendo the need for certain reform, properly worries about the
unsettling effect on the law and his clients.
This is not to fault the article for reading the entrails incorrectly. Just two
years ago the Supreme Court analyzed, as the article did along the same lines,
the question of who "sells" within the meaning of section 12(1). 183 And there
are many other examples.
Most amazing of all is that this middle-aged man, as I viewed him on the
lecture platform, was all of 35 years old when he co-authored this trail-blazing
critique.
180. 6 L.'Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3842 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
181. Douglas & Bates, supra note 177, at 213.
182. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
183. Compare Douglas & Bates, supra note 177, at 206-07, with Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 643
(1988). Douglas wrote of the identical language in section 12(2).
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